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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE RENEWABLE FUEL 
STANDARD (RFS) ON THE PRODUCTION OF FUEL ETHANOL  
IN THE U.S. 
 
Jay P. Kesan,* Hsiao-shan Yang,** and Isabel F. Peres*** 
 
Abstract 
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which mandates the 
commercialization of biofuels through 2022, is the United States’ most 
significant piece of legislation regarding renewable energy. It was first 
passed in 2005 and revised and expanded in 2007 in order to create a 
viable market for biofuels based on the policy goals of enhancing domestic 
U.S. energy security, reducing transportation-related greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, and stimulating rural economic development.  
The RFS requires minimum levels of consumption for different kinds 
of biofuels and requires increasing blending amounts of biofuels into 
gasoline and diesel fuels by producers and importers each year. Mandates 
and targets for biofuels as required by the RFS are not a policy exclusive 
just to the U.S. Sixty-four other countries mandate fixed quantities of 
ethanol use in gasoline to generally stimulate renewable energy use and 
to specifically promote production of biofuels.  
In the past few years, there have been challenges in complying with 
the RFS in the U.S. As a result, legislative mandates were modified and 
reduced to respond to these difficulties. Proponents of the RFS argue that 
the policy reduces the risk of investing in renewable fuel projects, 
enhances the country’s energy security as well as the rural sector, and 
addresses climate change concerns. On the other hand, critics argue that 
policy makers are “picking a winner” by funding biofuels over other types 
of alternative energy sources, and mandates for biofuels have presented 
unintended consequences in other areas, such as the food markets, land 
use patterns and the current gasoline-market infrastructure. Many studies 
have observed beneficial impacts of mandates on the agricultural markets 
and on the environment. However, there are very few empirical studies of 
the actual impact of the RFS on the development of the biofuel industry 
and none that use an industrial policy approach to analyze this issue.  
In this Article, we intend to fill this gap and provide an empirical 
study addressing whether the RFS is an effective policy instrument that 
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incentivizes an efficient and sustainable development of the biofuels 
industry. Our analysis uses data from the first-generation ethanol industry 
between the years 2000 and 2013, and we find that the industry life cycle 
mediates the effects of the RFS in contributing to production-related 
economies of scale. More specifically, our empirical findings suggest that 
the RFS had a significant positive effect on the production capacity of first-
generation ethanol firms during the early stages of development of the 
first-generation ethanol industry. But the RFS does not have a statistically 
significant effect on plant or firm capacity after the first-generation 
ethanol market entered a mature stage in its product life cycle.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The federal Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) is the single most important law 
and policy affecting the commercialization of biofuels in the United States and the 
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government’s first attempt to mandate demand for a type of renewable energy.1 As 
such, the RFS is considered the “most important [economic] value-added market” 
for agriculture since it changes the grain sector from a “surplus-driven marketplace 
to one that is vibrant, high-tech, and demand-driven.”2 
The RFS program was authorized under the Energy Policy Act enacted in 2005 
(the RFS was initially referred to as “RFS1”).3 The RFS mandates for biofuels 
require U.S. fuel refiners and importers to commercialize specific volumes of 
biofuels each year. 4  The RFS1 marks the first instance where biofuel 
commercialization was mandated by law. The initial biofuel mandates were 
substantially revised and expanded in 2007, but the original RFS1 mandates had an 
immediate impact at that time.5 In 2005, there were ninety-five ethanol refineries 
located in nineteen states producing four billion gallons of ethanol, an increase of 
17% in ethanol production from 2004 in response to the RFS mandates.6 The RFS1 
was substantially revised in 2007 with the passage of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 (i.e., the “RFS2”)7 and the industry continued growing—in 
2007, there were 139 biorefineries operating in twenty-one states producing 7.8 
billion gallons of ethanol.8  
The RFS policy is now facing an important time in its history. Despite 
increased production since the revisions brought by the RFS2, compliance with the 
mandated volumes has provoked several challenges to the industry and policy 
makers. For instance, while Congress projected the continuous increase in gasoline 
demand in 2007, the global recession in 2009 affected the consumption of petroleum 
                                                
1 Program Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY [hereinafter Program Overview], http://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-
program/program-overview-renewable-fuel-standard-program [https://perma.cc/57TJ-FD 
BY] (last updated Aug. 16, 2016).  
2 Communications in News, RFA to House Committee: RFS Is Single Most Important 
Economic Value-Added Market for Agriculture, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N (April 30, 2013, 
9:31 AM), http://www.ethanolrfa.org/2013/04/rfa-to-house-committee-rfs-is-single-most-
important-economic-value-added-market-for-agriculture/ [https://perma.cc/8AH8-9UNQ].  
3 Program Overview, supra note 1. 
4  RANDY SCHNEPF & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40155, 
RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD (RFS): OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 1, 4 (2013) [hereinafter RFS 
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES]. 
5 Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS1): Final Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewable-fuel-standard-
program-rfs1-final-rule [https://perma.cc/L45M-QQGG] (last updated Sept. 28, 2015). 
6 RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, FROM NICHE TO NATION: ETHANOL INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 
2006, at 2 (2006), http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/outlook_2006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JUP8-99AD]. 
7 Program Overview, supra note 1. 
8 RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, CHANGING THE CLIMATE: ETHANOL INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 
2008, at 2 (2008), http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RFA_Outlook_ 
2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4JF-GKQM].  
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products in the transportation sector, which, consequently, affected the viability of 
certain amounts of biofuel to be blended into gasoline.9  
Another challenge in implementing the different categories of biofuel mandates 
concerns second-generation ethanol, such as cellulosic ethanol, which is one of the 
categories with its own volume requirements under the RFS. 10  The 
commercialization of cellulosic ethanol has raised significant uncertainties—it was 
not until 2013 that the first three commercial-scale biorefineries producing cellulosic 
ethanol in the country started their operations.11 Higher blending volumes require 
higher-level ethanol blends, which are currently incompatible with automobile 
engines.12 Moreover, the current infrastructure also presents significant difficulties 
in absorbing higher ethanol mandates.13 
Challenges to the policy place the RFS program under constant scrutiny by both 
supporters of the program and opposing groups, and the question becomes whether, 
despite these challenges, the RFS mandates have achieved successful results in 
promoting the nascent first-generation ethanol industry.14 Until now, more than ten 
years after the enactment of the RFS program, no comprehensive studies have been 
conducted and no substantial data has been provided to answer that question. The 
existing literature fails to consider how the industry life cycle mediates the effects 
the RFS has on the economic sustainability of the U.S. biofuels industry. This Article 
answers this question and addresses the important gap in the scholarship in this area.   
At present, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the agency 
responsible for the implementation of the RFS program, is aware of these challenges, 
and it seeks to balance Congress’s intent of “increasing renewable fuel use over time 
                                                
9  EPA Sets Final Ethanol Levels, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/epa-sets-final-ethanol-levels/ [https://perma. 
cc/AR4T-Y8SD]. 
10 Program Overview, supra note 1. 
11 Sena Christian, Is Cellulosic Ethanol the Next Big Thing in Renewable Fuels?, 
EARTH ISLAND J. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eList 
Read/is_cellulosic_ethanol_the_next_big_thing_in_renewable_fuels/ [https://perma.cc/NM 
A4-8568]. 
12 RFS OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 27−28. 
13 Id. 
14 See, e.g., Todd Neeley, Ethanol and Oil Interests Challenge EPA Authority in RFS 
Program – DTN, AGFAX (June 23, 2016), http://agfax.com/2016/06/23/ethanol-and-oil-
interests-challenge-epas-in-rfs-program-dtn/ [https://perma.cc/9W4T-LBDR] (discussing 
the reasons why both ethanol and oil interests are challenging the EPA’s use of its waiver 
authority to set renewable volumetric obligations below statute); Daniel Simmons, Why 
Congress Should Fully Repeal the RFS, AM. ENERGY ALLIANCE (May 27, 2015), 
http://americanenergyalliance.org/2015/05/27/corn-ethanol-only-repeal-makes-the-rfs-
worse/ [https://perma.cc/Y4GQ-YW6N] (discussing the reasons why the RFS is a failed 
policy and advocating that the RFS should be repealed); Energy Tomorrow Blog, Growing 
Consensus On ‘Unworkable’ RFS, BREAKING ENERGY (Mar. 13, 2015, 2:00 PM), 
http://breakingenergy.com/2015/03/13/growing-consensus-on-unworkable-rfs/ 
[https://perma.cc/R4ZF-4C2Q] (discussing some of the groups opposing the RFS). 
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in order to address climate change and increase energy security while,” 
simultaneously, “accounting for the real-world challenges that have slowed progress 
toward such goals.”15 In light of these and other challenges, the EPA has had to 
overcome continuous criticism from petroleum-related interest industries to be able 
to implement the required mandates. On November 30, 2015, the EPA announced 
the much-expected final volume requirements for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 years as 
well as the final volume requirements for biomass-based diesel for 2014 through 
2017.16 The EPA is responsible for setting mandate requirements each November 
for the next year’s mandated biofuel volumes but has been behind on the schedule 
the past several years due to the challenges discussed above.17 In an effort to comply 
with the schedule for mandate requirements, the EPA has timely proposed volume 
increases across all types of biofuels under the RFS program for 2017.18 The total 
renewable fuel volumes would increase by approximately 700 million gallons 
between 2016 and 2017 under the proposed mandates.19  
This proposed increase for biofuels mandate is in line with the agency efforts 
to promote the growth of the biofuels industry. According to the EPA, this increase 
will “drive growth in renewable fuels, particularly advanced biofuels.”20 As we 
argue in this Article, our empirical evidence shows that the first-generation ethanol 
industry presented signs of growth with the implementation of the RFS policy. 
Likewise, the proposed increases under the RFS could have similar effects on the 
nascent second-generation ethanol industry. This Article corroborates the EPA’s 
efforts to increase mandates in 2017 that will promote the development of the early 
second-generation ethanol industry. Yet, as expected given the controversial nature 
and impact of the program, the past and current volume requirements have been a 
source of disagreement among the oil industry, policy makers, and the biofuels 
industry. Both the oil-related and ethanol industries are constantly dissatisfied with 
the level of ethanol mandates proposed by the EPA, the former calling for lesser 
                                                
15  Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and 
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,422 (Dec. 14, 2015) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
16  See Erin Voegele, EPA Releases Proposed 2014, 2015, 2016 RFS Volume 
Requirements, BIOMASS MAG. (May 29, 2015), http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/12000 
/epa-releases-proposed-2014-2015-2016-rfs-volume-requirements [https://perma.cc/52RA-
FN39]. 
17 Id. 
18 See Proposed Renewable Fuel Standards for 2017, and the Biomass-Based Diesel 
Volume for 2018, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-
standard-program/proposed-renewable-fuel-standards-2017-and-biomass-based-diesel 
[https://perma.cc/AG69-GRKF] (last updated June 1, 2016). 
19 Id. 
20 Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2017 and Biomass-Based Diesel 
Volume for 2018, 81 Fed. Reg. 34,778, 34,780 (May 31, 2016) (to be codified at 40 CFR Pt. 
80). 
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volumes and the latter for the statutory mandates to be imposed.21 While the EPA 
increased the levels of renewable fuels that it had previously proposed on June 10, 
2015,22 these levels are considerably less than the amounts required by the letter of 
the RFS.23 Similarly, the 2017 proposed standards also fall below the statutory 
volume requirements as set initially by Congress.24 Because the proposed levels are 
less than required by the statute, RFS supporters argue that the EPA has “delivered 
a blow” to the corn industry by not following the higher volume amounts of biofuels 
currently set by Congress.25 The reason behind this statement is that failing to meet 
the higher statutory demands halts the expansion and availability of renewable fuels 
to consumers. 26  For the 2017 proposed renewable fuel volumes by the EPA, 
supporters of the RFS argue that the 2017 volumes failed to meet it the agency stated 
goal of getting the RFS program “back on track.”27 In light of such disagreements 
that question the actual importance of the RFS program, we come back to the 
question initially posed: have the RFS mandates achieved successful results in 
promoting the nascent first-generation ethanol industry to justify its continuance? 
This Article provides an empirical study of the RFS effects on the economic 
sustainability of the existing U.S. biofuels industry. To evaluate these effects, we 
gather data on the characteristics of 216 first-generation ethanol production facilities 
in the U.S. Our theoretical model suggests that large-scale mandatory demand 
contributes to incentivizing the expansion of production capacity, and thus improves 
economies of scale, given that the market is still within the developing stage of its 
product life cycle (“PLC”). The PLC is a sequence of stages from the introduction 
of the product to growth, maturity, and decline that can be used to examine the 
                                                
21 See, e.g., Jessica Lyons Hardcastle, EPA Mandates Biofuel Volumes for 2016, Big 
Oil and BIO Attack Requirements, ENVTL. LEADER (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2015/11/30/epa-mandates-biofuel-volumes-for-2016-
big-oil-and-bio-attack-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/5ZTA-9H3N] (noting that both oil-
related and ethanol industries were not satisfied with the 2016 released mandates). 
22 Id. 
23  See Program Overview, supra note 1 (providing a table showing the volumes 
standards contained in the statute. The final 2016 volume requires 18.11 billion gallons of 
biofuels to be used in the national transportation fuel supply, which is below the 22.25 billion 
gallons required under the RFS2. While 4.25 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol are required 
under the RFS2 in the year 2016, the EPA mandates that 230 million gallons be mixed into 
the nation’s fuel market. Similarly, traditional corn-based ethanol is set at 14.5 billion gallons, 
500 million gallons below its target under the law). 
24 Id. 
25 See Alex Guillén, Obama Curbs Ethanol in Blow to Corn Growers, POLITICO (Nov. 
30, 2015 6:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/breaking-news-epa-scales-back-
ethanol-mandate-in-gasoline-216270 [https://perma.cc/5XUW-4XG7]. 
26 Id. 
27 See Spencer Chase, 2017 RFS Proposal Falls Short of Statutory Levels, AGRIPULSE 
(May 18, 2016), http://www.agri-pulse.com/2017-RFS-proposal-falls-short-of-statutory-
levels-05182016.asp [https://perma.cc/K2S8-YAFD]. 
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development of an industry.28 Since our data cover the years from 2000 to 2013, 
which includes periods without the RFS policy (2000–2005) and with the RFS 
policy (2006–2013), our study allows us to empirically investigate the impact of the 
RFS on production efficiency through an analysis of the changes in the first-
generation ethanol firms and plant production capacity.  
We show that the RFS program has had significant positive effects on 
developing economies of scale at the early stage of development of the first-
generation biofuels industry. Our data suggests that the RFS has strengthened the 
growth of the ethanol market in its distinct stages of the product life cycle (PLC). 
However, when the first-generation ethanol industry reached a mature stage in its 
PLC, the RFS does not have a statistically significant effect on plant or firm capacity 
in this industry. As a result, this empirical study has important implications to 
policies related to second-generation biofuels. We discuss and contrast the 
development of the first and second-generation ethanol industries, and their current 
stages of development. Once the second-generation biofuels industry reaches a 
similar PLC stage as the current first-generation ethanol industry, the RFS program 
may have similar effects on second-generation biofuels. This concept will be further 
developed throughout our analysis.  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a general background and 
briefly explores some of the history of the U.S. ethanol industry. It will articulate 
the policy goals behind the RFS program and emphasize how policies of biofuel 
mandates have also been implemented in different countries. Next, we provide 
important background information and policy implications of the RFS. Part III 
reviews recent work examining the impact of biofuel mandates and the specific 
effects of the RFS policy in the United States. Part IV sets out an economic model 
of large-scale mandatory demand, first providing a background of the well-known 
work of Gort and Klepper, and second, using our model to expand the PLC model 
to the ethanol market. Finally, Part V presents our empirical analysis from our 
sample of 216 first-generation U.S. ethanol facilities that are operated by 177 firms. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate how the RFS mandated demand 
impacted the ethanol market at the different stages of its PLC. We also discuss the 
policy implications to our empirical findings. Part VI provides our final remarks.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND  
 
The ethanol industry dates back decades before the RFS policy was enacted in 
2005, and this prior development has important consequences for our study. In this 
section, we will first briefly discuss the phase out of Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether 
(“MTBE”) and its impact on ethanol and some of the policies targeting ethanol 
consumption before the enactment of the RFS program. We will also discuss some 
important features of the RFS policy and assess the impact of the RFS in promoting 
the growth of the ethanol industry.  
                                                
28 Steven Klepper, Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation Over the Product Life Cycle, 
86 AM. ECON. REV. 562, 562 (1996) [hereinafter Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation]. 
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A.  The Development of the Ethanol Industry and Policies in the U.S. 
 
The ethanol industry in the U.S. dates back to 1979, when the Amoco Oil 
Company began marketing commercial alcohol-blended fuels, and it has expanded 
rapidly since 2002.29 U.S. ethanol consumption increased from 83 million gallons in 
1981 to 2.073 billion gallons in 2002.30 This growing trend is confirmed with recent 
estimates indicating that ethanol production totaled 14.313 billion gallons during the 
2014 calendar year.31 This sharp increase in ethanol consumption may have been 
due to two main reasons. First, the discovery of negative effects of MTBE in the 
environment, such as contamination of the soil and ground water.32 Second, the 
increase of ethanol consumption may be due to tax credits in support of ethanol.33 
The federal ethanol fuel incentives, together with state incentives, are generally 
conceded as the main driving force for ethanol production and use in the U.S.34 
Ethanol and MTBE have been mainly used as oxygenate additives to help 
gasoline burn more cleanly and increase its octane rating. 35  During the 1990s, 
gasoline refiners preferred to use MTBE because it was cheaper than ethanol and 
could be produced from petroleum refining outputs, but this trend was reversed 
around 2001. 36  MTBE consumption started falling in 2001, whereas ethanol 
consumption started rising, especially in 2005, in response to the replacement of 
MTBE and government policy incentives. 37  The MTBE effect on ethanol was 
                                                
29 JULIE KERR CASPER, ENERGY: POWERING THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 190 
(2007). 
30 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 287 (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM77-XUF3]. 
31 See Debra Levey Larson, Ethanol Production and Corn Consumption Prospects for 
2016, UNIV. ILL. EXTENSION, (Dec. 8, 2015), http://web.extension.illinois.edu/state/news 
detail.cfm?NewsID=32978 [https://perma.cc/3HLC-YJVF]. 
32  Charles Andrews, MTBE—A Long-Term Threat to Ground Water Quality, 36 
GROUND WATER 705, 705–06 (1998). 
33  See TOM MACDONALD, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, P600-04-001, ETHANOL FUEL 
INCENTIVES APPLIED IN THE U.S.: REVIEWED FROM CALIFORNIA’S PERSPECTIVE, 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2004-02-03_600-04-001.PDF [https://perma.cc/AM7X-
CRZ3] (describing the measures employed by state and federal government to advance the 
production and use of ethanol fuel in the country). 
34 See id. at 7. 
35  See Cleaner-Burning Gasoline Without MTBE, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/gasoline/cbgmtbe.htm [https://perma.cc/V9RY-HPLT] (last 
updated Sept. 25, 2008). 
36 See STEFAN OSBORNE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., ENERGY IN 2020: ASSESSING THE 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF CELLULOSIC ETHANOL 4 (Nov. 2007), 
http://www.trade.gov/media/publications/pdf/cellulosic2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H78-
MHLR] [hereinafter OSBORNE, ENERGY IN 2020].  
37 See Jadwiga Ziolkowska et al., Targets and Mandates: Lessons Learned from EU 
and US Biofuels Policy Mechanisms, 13 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 398, 398 
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mainly because a number of studies discovered that MTBE contaminates ground 
water and drinking water sources and also potentially risks human health.38 As a 
result, several states banned the use of MTBE as a gasoline additive, and ethanol 
rapidly replaced MTBE as a gasoline additive between 2002 and 2007.39 The RFS 
program has likely helped to boost this shift from using MTBE towards the common 
use of ethanol as a gasoline additive.40  
It is interesting to note that until the 1970s, there were no federal tax incentives 
promoting ethanol or any other renewable energy source. 41  Until then, federal 
energy tax policy focused almost exclusively on increasing the domestic production 
of oil and gas.42 The energy crisis and the increased concern with environmental 
issues in the 1970s caused a shift away from oil and gas in the focus of federal energy 
tax policy towards ethanol and other forms of renewable energy.43 As for incentives 
for increasing the use of ethanol in this period, thus prior to the RFS, significant 
federal programs aimed at supporting biofuels focused on providing tax credits in 
support of the production or blending of ethanol and biodiesel.44 For example, the 
Energy Tax Act of 1978 allowed for a motor fuel excise tax exemption, giving 
ethanol blends of at least 10% by volume a $0.40 exemption on every gallon under 
the federal motor fuels tax.45 Similarly, in 2004, the federal government created the 
Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (“VEETC”), which is also known as the 
blenders’ tax credit.46 The VEETC provided a $0.51 credit per gallon of pure ethanol 
blended with gasoline to blenders of ethanol, and it served as an incentive to 
                                                
(2010); Tancred Lidderdale, Motor Gasoline Outlook and State MTBE Bans, ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/special/pdf/mtbeban.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9 
H5-Y5U5] (last modified April 6, 2003) (showing tables indicating falling consumption of 
MTBE in 2001, when some states (e.g., Maine) banned the use of MTBE).  
38 See OSBORNE, ENERGY IN 2020, supra note 36. 
39 Id. (noting that “ethanol demand rose significantly at that time and was largely driven 
by state-level environmental regulations mandating oxygenate use”). 
40 See Soren T. Anderson & Andrew Elzinga, A Ban on One Is a Boon for the Other: 
Strict Gasoline Content Rules and Implicit Ethanol Blending Mandates, 67 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
& MGMT. 258, 259−66 (2014) (arguing that “the MTBE bans are important pre-existing 
regulations that must be considered when assessing the impacts of the federal Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS). . . . Beyond 2007, it is clear that ethanol consumption is rising above 
the level necessary to replace the banned MTBE.”). 
41  MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41227, ENERGY TAX POLICY: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AND CURRENT STATUS OF ENERGY TAX EXPENDITURES 2 
(2011).   
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See RFS OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 18−19. 
45 See James A. Duffield & Keith Collins, Evolution of Renewable Energy Policy, 
CHOICES, 1st Quarter 2006, http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2006-1/biofuels/2006-1-
02.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ96-YFRR].  
46 Amy Diggs, The Expiration of the Ethanol Tax Credit: An Analysis of Costs and 
Benefits, 19 POL’Y PERSP. 47, 48 (2012). 
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encourage ethanol use in gasoline until its expiration on December 31, 2011.47 These 
are just some of the examples of incentives and subsidies provided by the U.S. 
government for the use of biofuels since 1978.48  
Therefore, government incentives to ethanol use and production have played a 
central role in the use of ethanol fuel for gasoline blending. The enactment of the 
RFS, however, was a new approach to ethanol as it marked the first instance where 
its commercialization was mandated by law by requiring refiners and importers of 
traditional transportation fuels (i.e., gasoline and diesel fuel) to commercialize 
specific volumes of renewable biofuels every year between 2006 and 2022.49  
That being said, the RFS program differs from other programs in the U.S. as 
being the first legislative attempt to mandate demand for a type of renewable energy. 
The policy rationales behind the RFS were that increased use of biofuels in the 
transportation system would: (1) enhance U.S. energy security by mitigating the 
amount of petroleum-based fuels that need to be imported from foreign nations, (2) 
benefit the environment by reducing the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from the transportation sector, and (3) act as a boon for rural economic 
development.50 Given these rationales for incentivizing the use of biofuels, why was 
it necessary for the U.S. government to side step its typical policy instruments (e.g., 
tax subsidies, loan guarantees, research and development grants, etc.) and 
experiment with a mandatory demand regime?  
The legislative history of the RFS makes very little mention of why this 
particular policy instrument was selected;51 however, it likely has to do with the fact 
that biofuels must compete with petroleum-based fuels in the transportation fuel 
                                                
47 Id. at 47−48. 
48 See Wallace E. Tyner, U.S. Ethanol Policy—Possibilities for the Future, PURDUE 
EXTENSION BIOENERGY (2007), https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/id/id-342-
w.pdf [https://perma.cc/THM8-8R8H] (providing other examples of ethanol subsidy 
legislation). 
49 Program Overview, supra note 1. 
50 Economics of Biofuels, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
environmental-economics/economics-biofuels [https://perma.cc/K783-DH8X] (last updated 
May 27, 2016). 
51  See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-R-10-003, RENEWABLE FUEL 
STANDARD PROGRAM (RFS2) SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS, at 1-1 to 1-3 (2010), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/420r10003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z4M7-RMNA] (stating that the EPA believes that the “increase use of 
renewable fuels in place of petroleum fuels will provide both greenhouse gas and energy 
benefits to our nation, as well as significant economic benefits to our agricultural sector,” the 
rule “faithfully implements the requirements of EISA in a manner consistent with [the 
EPA’s] legal obligations, with sound science, and with sound environmental, energy, and 
economic policy,” and extensive analysis was conducted in support of the RFS). While the 
EPA mostly responded to several comments and questions regarding the policy model, 
lifecycle methodology, suppliers, etc., it does not detail how the policy instrument was 
particularly selected.  
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market, which is predominantly controlled by the entrenched petroleum industry.52 
The petroleum industry significantly controls the production and distribution 
infrastructure for transportation fuels in the U.S.53 Biofuels are traditionally blended 
with petroleum-based fuels before being distributed to customers, 54  and the 
commercial success of biofuels is, consequently, heavily reliant on their being 
purchased and utilized by the petroleum industry. Since actors in the petroleum 
industry would likely not seek to commercialize substitute products whose success 
would diminish the market share for their own products, it thus seems logical that 
the U.S. government would be the likely candidate to incentivize the increased use 
of biofuels. Hence, one option would be requiring the entrenched petroleum industry 
to commercialize biofuels via a mandatory demand regime that places its regulatory 
costs on the regulated entities. 
In short, government incentives have been part of the ethanol industry 
development, and one of the most important goals of the RFS policy is to keep 
expanding ethanol as a gasoline additive and promoting the consumption of biofuels. 
In addition, the RFS also has other important policy rationales, that being reducing 
oil dependency, reducing GHG emissions, and promoting rural development. That 
said, our analysis will not address or consider the impact of the RFS program on any 
of these policy rationales. Rather, this Article will focus on the actual impact of the 
RFS on the growth of the first-generation ethanol industry.  
 
B.  The Impact of the Renewable Fuel Standard in the U.S. Ethanol Industry 
 
In this Article, we focus on the economic impact of the RFS policy on the U.S. 
domestic biofuel market. Before we provide a brief overview of the program in the 
U.S., it is interesting to briefly note the impact of similar mandate requirements in 
other countries.  
Biofuel mandates are not an exclusive policy under the RFS; in fact, 
government mandates have been successfully employed by many different countries 
seeking to increase renewable energy use. Target government mandates for ethanol 
consumption is one of the options for reducing reliance on imported oil, and 
                                                
52 See Renewable Fuels Association, Analysis Shows U.S. Ethanol Is Lowest Cost Fuel, 
Octane Source, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (July 22, 2014), http://ethanolproducer.com/ 
articles/11271/analysis-shows-u-s-ethanol-is-lowest-cost-fuel-octane-source [https://perma. 
cc/6RQS-EN25].  
53 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY, Availability and Use of Alternative Fuels, in 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE MOTOR FUELS ACT CAFÉ 
INCENTIVES POLICY, https://one.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/CAFE/alternativefuels/index. 
htm#content [https://perma.cc/96XH-4FXD] (follow the “Availability and Use of 
Alternative Fuels” hyperlink).  
54 See Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Ethanol Is in Gasoline and How Does 
It Affect Fuel Economy?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm 
?id=27&t=10 [https://perma.cc/6QYU-CYXK] (last updated April 6, 2016). 
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government mandates are often combined with other policies. 55  Mandates are 
expected to promote positive changes in demand in the ethanol market, especially in 
the blending sector,56 and, in Brazil, ethanol mandates have allowed the country to 
greatly reduce its petroleum imports.57 At present, biofuels mandates are used by 
sixty-four other countries, which reflects their intentions to promote consumption 
and expansion of biofuels.58  
Currently, some of the major blending mandates that will drive demand of 
biofuels globally are those of the European Union (“EU”), Brazil, and the U.S.59 
Different than in the U.S., where mandates are based on volumes, most biofuel 
mandates in other countries are based on percentage shares of consumption. 60 
According to the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, the EU has an overall target of 
at least 10% of energy to be used in the transportation system coming from biofuels 
by 2020.61 Likewise, in Brazil, the government currently requires up to 27% of 
ethanol be mixed into gasoline.62  
Another difference between the U.S. policy and biofuels policies in other 
countries is that most of the different mandates worldwide focus on promoting first-
generation biofuels.63 In the U.S., at present, the RFS provides a mandatory market 
for not only first-generation biofuels (e.g., cornstarch ethanol and soy biodiesel), but 
it also creates a market for second-generation biofuels (e.g., advanced and cellulosic 
biofuels).64 Advanced biofuels mandates were part of the RFS requirements when it 
was first enacted in 2005. More recently, some countries have also started to require 
                                                
55 Harry de Gorter & David R. Just, The Social Costs and Benefits of Biofuels: The 
Intersection of Environmental, Energy and Agricultural Policy, 32 APPLIED ECON. PERSP. 
POL’Y 4, 11–14 (2010) (noting the benefit of combining different biofuel policies). 
56 Dong Hee Suh & Charles B. Moss, Dynamic Adjustment of Ethanol Demand to 
Crude Oil Prices: Implications for Mandated Ethanol Usage, EMPIRICAL ECON., DOI: 
10.1007s00191-01601112-6, at 2 (2016). 
57  Robert Wisner, Biofuels Mandates Outside the U.S., AGMRC (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.agmrc.org/renewable-energy/biofuelsbiorefining-general/biofuels-mandates-
outside-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/BJR3-L95C]. 
58 Jim Lane, Biofuels Mandates Around the World: 2016, BIOFUELS DIGEST (Jan. 3, 
2016), http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2016/01/03/biofuels-mandates-around-the-
world-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4KKP-KSTZ].  
59 Id. 
60 Timothy A. Wise & Emily Cole, Mandating Food Insecurity: The Global Impacts of 
Rising Biofuel Mandates and Targets 3 (Global Dev. & Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 15-
01, 2015), https://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/15-01WiseMandates.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S 
6A-5R32]. 
61  BOB FLACH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., NL5028, EU 
BIOFUELS ANN. 2015, at 4 (2015). 
62 Erin Voegele, Brazil to Increase Ethanol Blend to 27 Percent, ETHANOL PRODUCER 
MAG. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/12020/brazil-to-increase-
ethanol-blend-to-27-percent [https://perma.cc/R4F8-83B2]. 
63 Wise & Cole, supra note 60. 
64 RFS OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 2. 
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mandates for advanced biofuels.65 For instance, the Italian government was the first 
in Europe to create a 0.6% advanced biofuels mandate by 2018 to foster demand for 
advanced biofuels.66  
In the United States, the RFS currently exists as a system of nested mandates 
for four uniquely defined categories of biofuels.67 The broadest category of biofuel 
is called “renewable fuel” and is defined as including any fuel produced from 
renewable biomass that has lifecycle GHG emissions68 that are at least 20% lower 
than a baseline.69 The second category, “advanced biofuel,” is defined as including 
renewable fuels (with the explicit exclusion of corn-based ethanol) that have 
lifecycle GHG emissions that are at least 50% lower than the 2005 baseline.70 
“Cellulosic biofuel,” the third category, includes any fuel produced from the 
cellulose, hemi-cellulose, or lignin of renewable biomass that has lifecycle GHG 
emissions that are at least 60% lower than the 2005 baseline.71 The final category, 
“biomass-based diesel,” is defined as including renewable diesel fuels produced 
from renewable biomass that have lifecycle GHG emissions that are at least 50% 
lower than petroleum-based diesel’s 2005 lifecycle GHG emissions.72 Because these 
four categories are nested, any fuel that qualifies as either a cellulosic biofuel or a 
biomass-based diesel is also capable of being used to satisfy the RFS advanced 
biofuel mandate.73 Likewise, any fuel that qualifies as an advanced biofuel can also 
                                                
65 Mila Luleva, Use of Advanced Biofuels in Petrol Made Compulsory in Italy, THE 
GREEN OPTIMISTIC (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.greenoptimistic.com/use-advanced-
biofuels-petrol-made-compulsory-italy-20141015/#.VpkY8H6rTIW [https://perma.cc/RG 
8B-ZRXM] (noting that the U.S. has mandates for advanced biofuels, and Italy is now the 
first European country to set up such a demand target for advanced biofuels). 
66 Lane, supra note 58; Luleva, supra note 65 (noting that the U.S. has mandates for 
advanced biofuels, and Italy is now the first European country to set up such a demand target 
for advanced biofuels). 
67 RFS OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
68  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2006) (defining lifecycle GHG emissions as “the 
aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant 
indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use changes), as determined by 
the [EPA], related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock 
production and distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution 
and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for 
all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming potential”).  
69 RFS OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that the baseline is defined as 
the 2005 lifecycle GHG emissions associated with gasoline or diesel fuel (whichever the 
renewable fuel is replacing)).  
70 Id. at 4–6 (noting that the term “advanced biofuels” comes from legislation in the 
110th Congress, and is defined in Section 201 of the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 (EISA)). 
71 Id. at 6. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 5. 
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be used to satisfy the overarching renewable fuel mandate.74 Finally, fuels that can 
only satisfy the definition for renewable fuel (e.g., ethanol derived from corn starch) 
can only be used to satisfy the portion of the RFS mandates that are not required to 
be met with advanced biofuels.75 
Figure 1 illustrates the RFS mandates and ethanol consumption, showing the 
portion of the yearly RFS mandates that can be satisfied with the use of corn-based 
ethanol (i.e., the difference between total RFS renewable fuel mandate and its 
advanced biofuel mandate) and the U.S. annual consumption of ethanol. As shown 
in Figure 1, corn-based ethanol can be used to satisfy four billion gallons of the RFS 
mandates in 2006, and the volume increases over time to reach fifteen billion gallons 
in 2022. The trend of ethanol consumption coincides with the mandate and was at 
least 200 million gallons higher than the mandated volume before 2011. 
 
Figure 1: RFS Ethanol Mandates and Consumption  
(in Billions of Gallons) 
 
Source: Alternative Fuels Data Center, U.S. Department of Energy 
  
                                                
74 Id. 
75  KELSI BRACMORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43325, THE RENEWABLE FUEL 
STANDARD (RFS): IN BRIEF, at 3 (2015). 
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Figure 1 also shows that, for the first time in 2013, U.S. ethanol consumption 
was less than the mandate, which was complied with through the use of nonethanol 
biofuels.76 For instance, biodiesel consumption in 2013 was 1.4 billion gallons, 
which was 0.4 billion gallons more than the 2013 and 2014 RFS biomass-based 
diesel mandate.77 In other words, in 2013 the RFS mandated that obligated parties 
consume more ethanol than the amount that can be consumed solely by blending 
10% ethanol blends (E10) in 2013.78 This is known as the “blend wall.”79 Scholars 
have investigated whether there is a shift in the RFS policy effects when the ethanol 
industry faces the blend wall.80 This study suggests the effectiveness of the policy 
instrument is mostly driven by the PLC effect.   
Next, Figure 2 illustrates the relative volumetric price of ethanol to gasoline 
between 1982 and 2012.81 Based on the Nebraska Ethanol Board’s report of average 
rack prices for ethanol and unleaded gasoline from 1982 to 2010, the correlation 
coefficient is estimated at 0.9189.82 As one of the policy goals of the RFS program 
is to increase the energy security of the U.S. through the increased use of 
                                                
76 See Enesta Jones, EPA Proposes 2014 Renewable Fuel Standards / Proposal Seeks 
Input to Address “E10 Blend Wall,” Reaffirms Commitment to Biofuels, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (Nov. 15, 2013), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac 
8525735900400c27/81c99e6d27c730c485257c24005eecb0!OpenDocument [https://perma. 
cc/TR88-3U83] (discussing the reduction of 2014 standards in light of the blend wall and 
other issues in meeting the mandates). 
77 Biofuels: Ethanol and Biodiesel Explained: Use of Biodiesel, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://199.36.140.204/EnergyExplained/index.cfm?page=biofuel_biodiesel_use 
(last reviewed Aug. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BTT7-WNVD] (noting that substantial 
quantities of biodiesel were used to meet the RFS—and while consumption declined to about 
870 million gallons in 2012, it then increased to nearly 1.4 billion gallons in 2013 and 2014). 
78 EPA Finalizes Renewable Fuel Standard for 2013; Additional Adjustments Expected 
in 2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 14, 2013, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12531 [https://perma.cc/6ADN-ZUVH] 
(discussing the 2013 mandates and how limits on higher ethanol blending will require 
adjustments to the 2014 mandates).  
79  Blend Wall, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://ethanolrfa.org/issues/blend-wall/ 
[https://perma.cc/R62E-3DF9] (defining the “Blend Wall” as “the maximum quantity of 
ethanol that can be sold each year given legal or practical constraints on how much can be 
blended into each gallon of motor fuel”).  
80 See, e.g., Harry de Gorter, Dusan Drabik & David R. Just, Policy Update: Policy 
Implications of High RIN Prices and the ‘Blend Wall,’ 4 BIOFUELS 359, 359–61 (2013) 
(discussing how RIN prices show the blend wall has become a constraint). 
81 See Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline Average Rack Prices, OFFICIAL NEB. GOV’T 
WEBSITE, http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html [https://perma.cc/7XQR-VYLJ] (last 
updated Sept. 14, 2016). 
82 Correlation Coefficient, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
correlationcoefficient.asp#ixzz4KG2mC9Sk [https://perma.cc/JJM8-8RY6] (explaining that 
the correlation coefficient is a measure that determines the degree to which two variables’ 
movements are associated and that the range of values for the correlation coefficient is -1.0 
to 1.0). 
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domestically produced ethanol, it is crucial to evaluate the competitiveness of 
ethanol compared to gasoline.  
Figure 2 shows that the relative volumetric price of ethanol to gasoline falls 
over time, and dips below 1 in 2008 and between 2010 and 2013. While the effective 
volumetric price of ethanol is now lower than that of gasoline, the fact that ethanol 
possesses only 66% the energy content of gasoline should be considered.83  
 
Figure 2: Ratio of Fuel-Ethanol Rack Price to Unleaded Gasoline Rack Price  
(per gallon; F.O.B. Omaha, NE) 
 
Source: Nebraska Ethanol Board 
 
The current price ratio in Figure 2 indicates that although ethanol might not yet 
be competitive with gasoline on an energy content basis, we are seeing the increasing 
competitiveness of ethanol. 84  Besides, fuel economy is not the only factor to 
consider in determining whether gasoline and ethanol are perfect substitutes. 
Ethanol not only has a higher octane rating than gasoline, but consumers may begin 
to value the environmental benefits that result from using ethanol (e.g., reduced 
GHG emissions).85 
                                                
83 See Mark M. Wright & Robert C. Brown, Costs of Thermochemical Conversion of 
Biomass to Power and Liquid Fuels, in THERMOCHEMICAL PROCESSING OF BIOMASS: 
CONVERSION INTO FUELS, CHEMICALS AND POWER 307, 320 (Robert C. Brown ed., 2011) 
(stating that the lower energy content of ethanol, as compared to gasoline on a volumetric 
basis, “affects the range of vehicles fueled on these alcohols”). 
84  See John M. Urbanchuk, The Economic Competitiveness of U.S. Ethanol, ABF 
ECON., at 16 (July 2014), http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Economic 
_Competitiviness_Study1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHS2-NND2] (concluding that the market 
prices and trade data shows that U.S. ethanol is an “exceptionally competitive additive and 
fuel source”). 
85 See, e.g., Ethanol Vehicle Emissions, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://www.afdc.energy. 
gov/vehicles/flexible_fuel_emissions.html [https://perma.cc/H2MW-WC69] (“A 2012 
study by Argonne National Laboratory found that when these entire fuel life cycles are 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1982198419861988199019921994199619982000200220042006200820102012
2017] RFS ON FUEL ETHANOL 175 
 
Annual ethanol production capacity has grown significantly in recent years. In 
2013, the U.S. ethanol production was 13,300 million gallons.86 The number of 
plants and firms has also increased with the growth of the ethanol industry, and we 
can observe that mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) events happened more 
frequently in the past several years.87 The M&A activity indicates that the ethanol 
market is still within its early stage of product life cycle.88 This is the case because 
merger activity is associated with changes in the market, and still progressing to a 
mature stage. 89  Figure 3 illustrates M&A transactions in the ethanol industry 
between 2001 and 2013, and show two concave climbing patterns for plant and firm 
number. It is observed that the number of firms drops in 2008, and the reason for 
this drop might be that inefficient firms exited the market during the nationwide 
recession of 2008.90 
  
                                                
considered, using corn-based ethanol instead of gasoline reduces life cycle GHG emissions 
by 19–48% depending on the source of energy used during ethanol production.”). 
86 Industry Statistics, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/resources/ 
industry/statistics/ [https://perma.cc/867B-B4JV] (click on “2013” to view the statistics). 
87 See Chris Prentice, CHS Buys Ethanol Plant, In Long-Term Biofuels Bet, REUTERS 
(Jun. 1, 2015, 6:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/markets-ethanol-chs-
idUSL1N0YN2KS20150601 [https://perma.cc/N9HE-Z3W5] (discussing a new acquisition 
and how parties involved in the transaction believe “ethanol industry is going to continue to 
evolve and consolidate over time”); see also JAMES A. DUFFIELD & HARRY BAUMES, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC., CHAPTER 8: POLICY CHANGES AND FUTURE DIRECTION OF BIOFUELS, in U.S. 
ETHANOL: AN EXAMINATION OF POLICY, PRODUCTION, USE, DISTRIBUTION, AND MARKET 
INTERACTIONS 70 (James A. Duffield et. al. eds., 2015) http://www.usda.gov/oce/reports/ 
energy/EthanolExamination102015.pdf [https://perma.cc/83TZ-PP4P] (“Since the 1970s, 
the ethanol industry has grown from a few small firms to about 200 plants operating in 29 
States, with an annual operating capacity of 14.6 billion gallons.” (citation omitted)). 
88 See Michael Gort, An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers, 83 Q. J. ECON. 624, 
627 (1969) (arguing that mergers are in many instances prompted by a shock, such as a 
change in technology). 
89 Id. 
90  Erin Voegele, Recession Continues to Impact Ethanol Industry, ETHANOL 
PRODUCER MAG. (May 4, 2009), http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/5677/recession-
continues-to-impact-ethanol-industry [https://perma.cc/R4F8-83B2]. 
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Figure 3: Number of Operating Plants, Firms, and M&A Transactions 
 
Source: Renewable Fuels Association and CapitalIQ. 
Note: M&A count in 2013 only includes data before March, 2013, thus the number is underestimated. 
 
Additionally, the cost of corn rose sharply in 2008 while the price of gasoline 
dropped, which put tremendous pressure on the profit margins for corn-based 
ethanol producers.91 Figure 3 also shows that the growth in number of plants is 
greater than the growth in number of firms. That might be the result of M&A activity 
since the rising M&A number after 2008 implies that firms expanded through 
acquiring existing plants.  
The RFS policy comes to provide for mandatory blending levels for renewable 
fuels, and similar policies are successfully being used in several other countries. The 
importance of the policy is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, which show that ethanol 
fuel is still not able to compete with gasoline, and the ethanol industry is still in its 
nascent stage where the industry is marked by M&A transactions. Given these 
scenarios, the RFS policy provides for a steady demand of biofuels and plays an 
important role in promoting the biofuels industry in its early stage. 
 
III.  PREVIOUS WORK STUDYING THE IMPACT OF THE RENEWABLE FUEL 
STANDARD 
 
We now draw attention to some of the recent studies of the RFS program and 
its environmental, agricultural, and economic impacts in the U.S. ethanol and related 
markets. Ever since it was enacted in 2005, the RFS and its impacts on different 
areas have received a great deal of scholarly attention.  
                                                
91 Robert Wisner, Impact of High Corn Prices on Ethanol Profitability, AGMRC (Aug. 
2008), http://www.agmrc.org/renewable-energy/ethanol/impact-of-high-corn-prices-on-
ethanol-profitability/ [https://perma.cc/BJR3-L95C]. 
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First, the RFS effects on global GHG emissions have been widely studied. 
Hertel et al. assessed the interaction between the renewable fuel mandates of the two 
largest biofuel programs, the U.S. and the EU, and its impacts on global GHG 
emissions. 92  The authors concluded that the mandates and policy interactions 
between these two important players may have a significant impact on global land 
use and, in turn, a significant impact on GHG emissions.93  Mosnier et al. also 
examined the impacts of the RFS and other alternative biofuel policy designs on 
global GHG emissions from land use change and agriculture between 2010 and 
2030.94  They concluded that the RFS program would significantly increase the 
agricultural land needed for biofuel feedstock production and it would also affect 
the price of U.S. exports.95 As for GHG, the authors assert that the effects vary: first, 
if the mandate level is reduced below what is determined by the RFS (50% or 75% 
of the current mandate), the emissions outside the U.S. would reduce proportionally 
with the increase in U.S. emissions, and there is no net change in global GHG 
emissions from altering the U.S. mandate; second, if the current RFS mandate is 
raised (125% or 150%), this raise in the mandate would lead to an increase in 
emissions outside the U.S. that exceeds reductions in U.S. fossil fuel emissions, 
which in turn means a net increase in emissions globally.96  
Huang et al. examined the economic implications of incorporating both the 
RFS and the Low Carbon Fuel Standard and concluded that using both policies 
would lead to a greater GHG emission reduction than would be achieved when 
employing one policy over the other. 97 Similarly, Khanna et al. concluded that 
“supplementing the RFS with a price on all fuels based on their GHG intensity raises 
social welfare above the level with the RFS alone and lowers GHG intensity and 
overall fuel consumption.”98 Rajagopal et al. compared the RFS mandates and a fuel 
emission standard that may be utilized to achieve different outcomes, such as a 
reduction in fuel prices, fuel imports, and GHG emissions.99 In regards to the GHG 
emissions, the authors found that when compared to an ethanol mandate, an emission 
                                                
92 Thomas W. Hertel, Wallace E. Tyner & Dileep K. Birur, The Global Impacts of 
Biofuel Mandates, 31 ENERGY J. 75, 75 (2010). 
93 Id. at 97−98. 
94 A. Mosnier et al., Alternative U.S. Biofuel Mandates and Global GHG Emissions: 
The Role of Land Use Change, Crop Management and Yield Growth, 57 ENERGY POL’Y 602, 
602 (2013). 
95 See id. at 609. 
96 Id. 
97  Haixiao Huang et al., Stacking Low Carbon Policies on the Renewable Fuels 
Standard: Economic and Greenhouse Gas Implications, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 5, 14 (2013). 
98 Madhu Khanna et al., Land Use and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Effects of Biofuel 
Policies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 549, 580 (2011). 
99  Deepak Rajagopal et al., Multi-Objective Regulations on Transportation Fuels: 
Comparing Renewable Fuel Mandates and Emission Standards, 49 ENERGY ECON. 359, 
359−61 (2015). 
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standard would result in lower global emissions while requiring less biofuel, but 
emissions standards result in somewhat higher fuel prices.100 
Moreover, Thompson et al. posits that biofuel mandates may have both positive 
and negative impacts on GHG emissions and these impacts are related to indirect 
effects of biofuel policies in the petroleum product markets.101 The authors reiterate 
that the reduction of GHG emissions is one of the goals of the U.S. biofuel policy, 
and they use economic models to show how biofuel tax credits, ethanol tariffs, and 
mandates may influence the extent to which this goal is achieved.102 They found that 
ceasing tax credits and the ethanol tariff or removing mandates can cause a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions, but this conclusion depends on many factors.103 More 
recently, Wang used economic models that integrate the agriculture, forest and 
transportation fuel sectors to examine the short-run and long-run effects of the RFS 
on agricultural and forest biomass, food, fuel, wood markets, and land use change.104 
His results concluded that, first, the RFS would lead to the production of 
approximately 1600 billion liters of corn ethanol over the 2010–2035 periods, and, 
after year 2025, energy crops and crop residues will play the leading role in 
cellulosic feedstocks production. 105  Second, the author concluded that the 
production of cellulosic feedstocks biofuels will not cause significant land use 
change between and within agricultural and forest sector as compared to a situation 
without a biofuel policy.106 Third, the author reckons that the total annual GHG flux 
under the RFS program in 2035 will be improved by 6.9%, together with social 
welfare increases by 4% relative to situations where a biofuel policy does not 
exist.107 Thus, in regard to GHG emissions, while the “RFS slightly increases GHG 
flux in forest sector due to higher rate of land deforestation, the total annual GHG 
flux is projected to be improved by year 2035 because of increased soil carbon 
sequestration in energy crops and avoided emissions from burning of fossil 
fuels.”108  
Second, studies have found that the RFS program impacts the price of gasoline 
and other commodities. For instance, McPhail and Babcock studied the effect of the 
                                                
100 Id. at 366. 
101 Wyatt Thompson et al., Effects of US Biofuel Policies on US and World Petroleum 
Product Markets with Consequences for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 
5509, 5509−11 (2011). 
102 Id. For example, biofuel trade and compliance costs. 
103 Id. at 5517. 
104 Weiwei Wang, Energy Crops vs. Forest Biomass for Meeting the Renewable Fuel 
Standard: Implications for Land Use and GHG Emissions, at 3 (May 5, 2016) (unpublished 
research paper, University of Illinois), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2776426 [https://perma.cc/N9N5-XZFP]. 
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107 Id. at 13–14. 
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U.S. ethanol policy on the price variability of gasoline in the U.S.109 The authors 
contend that the RFS mandates and the blend wall reduce the price elasticity of 
demand for gasoline and corn, thereby increasing their price variability in the event 
of shocks, and policy actions should take this fact into consideration.110 Similarly, 
Thompson et al. analyzed the petroleum and petroleum product markets and found 
that terminating mandates, biofuel tax credits, and ethanol tariffs lowered biofuel 
use, and it could lead to increased use of petroleum in the U.S. and a reduction in 
petroleum product use in other parts of the world.111  
Babcock employed simulations under different gasoline prices and ethanol 
demand elasticities to assess whether the ethanol industry would endure in the 
absence of a mandate.112 The author concluded that in the absence of subsidies in 
the ethanol industry, ethanol would likely not be viable if gasoline prices are low.113 
Additionally, utilizing a VAR model, McPhail argues that biofuels affect the crude 
oil markets, and, despite the small size of the U.S. ethanol market, the U.S. ethanol 
market has significant effects on the crude oil market as a whole.114  
Third, the effects of the RFS policy on agricultural production and markets 
have also been widely analyzed. As noted, McPhail and Babcock analyzed the corn 
market and the impacts of the RFS mandates on the demand of corn for ethanol 
production.115 The authors argue that ethanol production created a new demand for 
corn, which, in turn, decreased the price elasticity of corn, increasing its price 
variability.116 Miljkovic et al. examined the direct and indirect effects of the ethanol 
policy on livestock production.117 The authors examined the interaction between 
corn, dried distiller’s grains, ethanol, and livestock as competition for corn 
increases.118 One of their findings was that ethanol policy may indirectly impact 
cattle production through the influence of the RFS on corn quantity availability.119 
Additionally, in analyzing the impact of the ethanol policy on corn prices, Condon 
et al. found that a one billion gallon expansion of the U.S. corn ethanol mandate in 
                                                
109 Lihong Lu McPhail & Bruce A. Babcock, Impact of U.S. Biofuel Policy on US Corn 
and Gasoline Price Variability, 37 ENERGY 505, 506 (2012). 
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the year 2015 would lead to up to a 4% increase in corn prices.120 Finally, Enciso et 
al. analyzed the impact of eliminating biofuel policies (mandates, tax credits, import 
and export tariffs) on agricultural price levels and price, and some aspects related to 
global food security employing a recursive-dynamic, agricultural multicommodity 
model within a stochastic framework.121 Their results indicated that while abolishing 
biofuel policies would have a significant effect on price variability of biofuels, the 
removal of these policies would have a marginal impact on the variability of 
agricultural commodity prices.122 
Lastly, some studies have explored the development of efficiencies in corn 
ethanol production. For instance, Chen and Khanna considered the role of elements 
such as economies of scale, cumulative experience, and trade-induced competition 
from imported ethanol to explain the reduction of processing costs of corn ethanol 
and increased production volumes in the U.S.123 Their study suggests that the U.S. 
corn ethanol production displayed decreasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing 
played an important role in reducing these processing costs, and imported sugarcane 
ethanol made the corn ethanol industry more competitive.124 Moreover, Chen and 
Önal examined the impact of the implementation of the RFS and Renewable 
Portfolio Standards on agricultural commodity markets, namely production, 
consumption, and prices of multiple food and feed crops.125 Their study has found 
that the impacts of the implementation of the two policies on agricultural commodity 
markets, spatial distribution of future cellulosic biorefineries, and regional supply of 
biomass is highly dependent on the targets set for cellulosic biofuels and bio-power 
production.126 
Yet, the existing literature fails to consider how the industry life cycle mediates 
the effects that the RFS has on the economic sustainability of the U.S. biofuels 
industry. Every product market has its own PLC, and the ethanol market is no 
exception. As mentioned above, the PLC is the idea that a product undergoes 
different stages, from the introduction of the product to growth, maturity, and 
eventual decline. It makes little sense to mandate demand for products via a policy 
instrument unless a primary policy goal is to increase the economic sustainability of 
those products, and thereby help create a lasting market for them. Moreover, the 
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ethanol market has existed since 1979, and mandating demand might produce 
distinct effects in different stages of its PLC.127  
As such, it is of the utmost importance to explore the impact of the RFS on 
production efficiencies within the U.S. biofuels industry at different stages of its 
PLC in order to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy instrument. That is the focus 
of this Article.  
 
IV.  THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE MODEL APPLIED TO THE RENEWABLE FUEL 
STANDARD 
 
So far we have provided a general background of the ethanol market and some 
government subsidies and tax programs that have positively impacted its 
development. We then delved into the important features of the RFS program, and 
presented information about the price of gasoline vs. the price of ethanol, the 
production capacity of ethanol plants, and the expansion of the industry. In Part III, 
we examined some of the different studies analyzing the diverse economic and 
environmental impacts of the RFS policy. We have found that the existing literature 
has not considered the actual effects of the economic viability of the RFS policy. In 
this Article, we raise an important question that no other study has investigated so 
far.  
In this section, we will first provide a brief explanation of the theoretical model 
used in our study and important premises to understanding the significance of our 
work. Next, we will delve into our economic model that will be used to evaluate the 
data and draw important conclusions from empirical evidence in the ethanol industry.  
 
A.  The Theoretical Model: The Product Life Cycle and Product Innovation 
 
Our empirical analysis employs the insights of the product life cycle from Gort 
and Klepper,128 and the PLC framework developed by Klepper,129 to investigate and 
better understand how the ethanol industry evolved from its nascent stage to a mature 
stage before and after the enactment of the RFS. For that reason, a brief explanation 
                                                
127 See Hyunok Lee, Ethanol’s Evolving Role in the U.S. Automobile Fuel Market, in 
INDUSTRIAL USES OF AGRICULTURAL MATERIALS: SITUATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT 49–54, 
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128 See generally Michael Gort & Steven Klepper, Time Paths in the Diffusion of 
Product Innovations, 92 ECON. J. 630 (1982) (measuring and analyzing the diffusion of 
product innovations). 
129 See generally Steven Klepper, Industry Life Cycles, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 145 
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of the Gort-Klepper PLC work and the model developed by Klepper is imperative 
to understanding our arguments below. 
Gort and Klepper documented the development of forty-six products in 
connection with their price, output, sales, and change in number of firms (net entry) 
over the life of each product. 130  The authors found evidence that different 
manufacturing industries follow similar life cycle phases. 131  Their study drew 
attention to five distinguishable stages in the evolution of the product market, and 
the authors studied prices and firms across these stages.132  
In the first stage, a new product is first introduced into the market, and this 
stage ends with a period of new firms rapidly entering the market for this new 
product.133 In the second stage, Gort and Klepper found evidence of a sharp growth 
in the number of firms.134 This stage is commonly followed by a period in which the 
number of firms in the market levels out.135 In the third stage, the number of new 
firms is close to the number of exiting firms, which means that the actual net entry 
in this period is close to zero.136 The next stage is characterized by a sharp decline 
in the number of firms. In the authors’ words, this fourth stage is a period of 
“negative net entry.” 137  The exit rate eventually slows, and the market reaches 
stabilization in the last stage, in which there is almost no new entry.138 
In summary, Gort and Klepper studied the evolution of industry structure by 
analyzing a broad range of products. Their work suggests that many of the attributes 
of the PLC model may be found across different industries.139 New entrants are 
generally concentrated in the early stage; product innovation reaches its highest rate 
early; productivity tends to decline over time; mass exits (shakeouts) are common; 
and early entrants tend to dominate their respective markets.140 
In light of Gort and Klepper’s work, our model is based on the very well-known 
contribution of Klepper to PLC theory.141 Klepper created a dynamic evolutionary 
model to analyze the different stages of the PLC in an industry. Klepper’s model 
produced results that are in line with the empirical observations of the PLC. Klepper 
first emphasizes six regularities concerning how entry, market structure, 
technological change, and exit vary through the different stages of the PLC. First, as 
described above, at the beginning stage of an industry, the number of entrants may 
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rise, but this number tends to decline over time until the number of new entrants 
becomes small or zero.142 The frequency of change of the market shares of the largest 
firms in an industry declines, leading to the stabilization of the industry in terms of 
leadership.143  
Another regularity concerns diversity, a measure of the variations of products 
that compete within a given market. The number of product innovations, and 
therefore product diversity, tends to be the highest during the period of growth in 
the number of producers, eventually declining over time.144 Moreover, producers 
tend to allocate increasing amounts of effort to the process and making of products 
than to product innovation. 145  Finally, Klepper observed that during the period 
where there is a growth in the number of producers in the industry, the most recent 
entrants are responsible for a very large share of product innovations.146 These 
regularities provide the cornerstone for the author’s theoretical analysis.  
The key topic of Klepper’s work is analyzing industry evolution when 
innovation is present and influencing the industry’s size, entry, and shakeout 
patterns through changes in the production process.147 In the beginning of each of 
the PLC stages, at the firm-level, firms have different choices and their decisions are 
based on their expected profit. Incumbents must decide whether they remain in or 
exit the market while potential entrants must resolve whether or not they will enter 
the market. The market grows through the entry of new firms. All firms are price 
takers, meaning that they produce a standard product, and the price clears the 
market.148 
Klepper’s first premise is that the demand of a product is the incentive for 
product and process innovation.149 The latter of the two, process innovation, is 
determined by the total demand for the firm’s product. Process innovation is 
designed to lower a firm’s average cost of production.150 The greater the demand for 
the product, the greater the potential return of process innovation. Product 
innovation, on the other hand, is generally designed to attract new buyers.151 While 
new products appeal to all buyers, the assumption is that only new buyers may be 
willing to pay for the price increase.152 Second, Klepper affirms that firms have 
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different skills and capabilities that govern the type and effectiveness of their 
innovation efforts.153 New firms must decide if their product development skills are 
sufficient to jump in and earn a profit and to survive given the incumbents’ volume-
based advantages.  
Klepper suggests that firms may take advantage of research and development 
(“R&D”) costs because of their size, and their incentives and types of product 
innovations may shift internally as firms grow larger.154 Therefore, Klepper’s model 
is relevant for analyzing the RFS program because it introduced the idea that the 
historical sequence of events in the introduction of a new product is a critical 
determinant of the final structure of the new product market.155 The development of 
the ethanol market, from its nascent to its more recent mature stage, closely followed 
the pattern of the PLC model.  
In conclusion, Klepper’s findings guide our analysis and help us to understand 
how the ethanol market efficiently and sustainably evolved from birth to maturity, 
including the period defined by the presence of the RFS policy mandating minimum 
biofuel consumption.  
 
B.  The Ethanol Industry Under the Lens of the Product Life Cycle Model 
 
Gort and Klepper define a product market at its early growing stage as one in 
which the product market grows in terms of the number of firms.156 They define a 
market as being at its mature stage when sustainable growth is not possible or the 
market starts to experience shakeout.157  
As shown in Figure 3 discussed above, both the number of plants and the 
number of firms in the ethanol market grew consistently prior to 2008, and the 
number of new entrants slightly stabilized after that date. Hence, in accordance with 
the different life cycle phases of the PLC model, the ethanol market experienced 
both its early nascent growing stage and its mature stage after the RFS policy was 
implemented. Because our data shows that the ethanol market underwent strong 
expansion after the RFS mandates were implemented, this Article attempts to study 
whether the policy affected the economic sustainability of the existing U.S. biofuels 
industry.  
For that end, we adapt the PLC model to understand how the mandates may 
strengthen the growth of the ethanol market in the industry’s distinct life cycle stages. 
A full list of the variables and a complete mathematical explanation of our model 
may be found in the Appendix.  
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1.  Preliminary Assumptions Under Our Model of Large-Scale Mandatory Demand 
 
As stated above, Klepper presents a complete model showing trends along the 
PLC, demonstrating that, over time, increasing production efficiency cannot catch 
up with the declining price pattern driven by exogenous factors that are not 
controlled by individual firms.158 As such, product markets eventually will stop 
growing with increasing production efficiency. 159  We adopt the framework 
introduced by Klepper for two reasons. First, ethanol producers have limited control 
over the price of their product. Second, this study attempts to answer how the RFS 
mandates impact the ethanol market at different stages of its PLC. Thus, we modify 
the model assumptions to fit the characteristics of the ethanol market. 
In order to simplify the model, we consider aggregated production decisions at 
the firm level. This enables us to focus on how firms make decisions according to 
market competition and changes in policy. We will discuss within-firm decision 
making in the empirical section. The plant-level growth pattern will be investigated 
empirically for a comparison with the firm-level production decision. It is important 
to understand the two channels through which an industry expands: (1) expansion 
of existing firms, and/or (2) entry of new firms.160 Since a firm can operate one or 
multiple plants, it can also grow at the firm level by increasing the production 
capability of existing plants, constructing new plants, or adding plants through 
acquisition. This means that an industry can expand without an actual increase in the 
number of new players in the industry.  
All decisions made by a firm, especially whether to enter or remain in the 
market, are presumed to be made based on the firm’s expected profits. 161  The 
expected profit function is a function of the sale price and output of the firm minus 
the cost to produce the product, which accounts for production efficiency and for 
monitoring and managing the operations of its opponents.162 
As is to be expected, a firm would behave in a manner so as to maximize the 
expected profit function. 163  When a firm decides to enter the market, it must 
determine whether its investment capabilities are sufficient to enter the market and 
earn a profit. The firm’s production efficiency is considered when defining the 
expected profits of a firm. A greater production efficiency level indicates a higher 
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efficiency, in which the production efficiency level is, in turn, determined by the 
latest technology available for investment when a firm decides to enter the market.  
This assumption fits well in the ethanol industry since the industry does not 
typically have R&D sectors within producing firms.164 The R&D usually happens 
upstream and the latest technology is available for all firms willing to invest in it.165 
Because the technology keeps evolving, new entrants invest in the newest 
technology and are able to produce more efficiently in terms of marginal cost with 
their production efficiency level.166 The expense for the latest technology, however, 
is not trivial and, for that reason, we assume that incumbents do not upgrade their 
technology. As such, new entrants are equipped with the latest technology and are 
capable of more efficient production. This assumption will be considered in the 
production function of new entrants.  
However, in accordance with the PLC stages described above, this pattern of 
innovation usually slows down after the PLC enters the mature stage,167 and thus 
new entrants’ relative advantage in production efficiency also decreases based on 
their entry timing. Besides the production cost, we also take into account the firm’s 
cost of monitoring and managing the operations and innovations of its opponents. In 
order to simplify this model, a constant input cost 𝑐 is assumed in the expected profit 
function.  
The ethanol product price is a function of the demand for ethanol, the price of 
gasoline, and the number of competitors in the market.168 The market demand at a 
specific time is fulfilled by the total supply of all firms.169 This total supply is the 
summation of the supply of every individual firm in the market. Because the price 
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of ethanol is highly correlated to the price of gasoline, we assume that the ethanol 
price at a certain time is a function of the price of the gasoline at that same time. In 
addition to the effect from the changes of gasoline price, industry evolution theory 
suggests that price declines with growing demand over time due to competition 
among firms, which also results in increasing production efficiency at the industry 
level.170 In the long run, inefficient firms would be driven out of the market if their 
expected profit is negative, and then the price would stay stable, ceteris paribus.171  
 
2.  A Simple Model of Large-Scale Mandatory Demand 
 
We solve a firm’s profit maximization problem with respect to the firm output 
capacity and its first order condition (i.e., setting equal to zero the derivative of the 
firm output capacity since it is the function being maximized). We first derived the 
optimal capacity of a firm by considering that the marginal costs increase with 
increases in the firm output capacity and by keeping the marginal revenue as a 
constant. The marginal costs increase with the increase in the firm output capacity 
because, at a certain production level, producing one more unit of output will 
eventually cost more.172 This increase in production cost may be due, among other 
things, to inputs being used less effectively. For that reason, marginal costs increase. 
The marginal cost and the firm’s optimal capacity are presented in the Appendix.173  
Substituting the optimal capacity function into the expected profit function 
discussed above, we find that firms would make an entry decision if the expected 
optimal profit is greater than zero.174 The exit decision, on the other hand, is based 
on the zero profit condition, and firms exit if they expect a zero or negative profit. 
An inefficient firm with a smaller production efficiency level cannot compete with 
more efficient firms. In other words, less efficient firms will be run out of the market, 
and only firms that can economically survive the competition will remain in the 
market.  
In the ethanol market, market demand is mandated in each period, which causes 
a change in demand.175  We define the ratio of current demand to the previous 
period’s demand, where the mandated growth rate is always positive, implying that 
the ratio of current to past demand is greater than unity.176 This positive, growing 
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market demand creates profitable opportunities for new entrants to act 
opportunistically by taking advantage of the gap between growing demand and 
existing supply. That is because the incumbents deviate from their optimal 
production capacity by hesitating to increase production capacity and drive prices 
down.  
Thus, we expect an increasing number of firms in the market with the growth 
of the mandated demand stimulating market demand. However, as explained in 
section IV.A above, when the PLC reaches a mature stage, new entrants no longer 
have a competitive advantage in terms of production efficiency. New entrants do not 
have this competitive advantage because the technology has been developed and is 
common to all market entrants. When the PLC reaches a mature stage, prices 
stabilize. 177  As such, there are reduced opportunities for new entrants to act 
opportunistically, which would make the mandated demand attract fewer new 
entrants now that the market has reached its mature stage.  
Two results would reflect the nature of this model. The first result shows that 
the mandated demand incentivizes new entry, but the growth of entry is at a 
declining rate. The growing market demand creates profitable opportunities for new 
entrants. Nevertheless, as noted, when the PLC enters a mature stage, these new 
entrants no longer have a competitive advantage in terms of production efficiency. 
That is because the technology that once was their advantage has now become the 
standard and is common to all market participants.  
The second result shows that new entrants create more competition, thereby 
bringing the price down. In this case, the demand for ethanol shifts up, incentivizing 
new entry into the market in the early stage. Because new entrants hold the latest 
technology, they are able to produce at a lower marginal cost and then increase their 
market share through price competition.178 These new market entrants are thus able 
to gain market share by offering lower prices. The ethanol price would be reduced 
as a result of competition, and the price reflects a decreasing pattern along the PLC. 
Hence, new entry will stir up competition and bring prices down.   
Based on these first and second results, the optimal capacity of the incumbents 
needs to be reduced in response to the declining price pattern because the slope of 
the profit versus price curve is positive,179 and a declining price pattern produces 
declining profits. This decline in profits would call for the capacity to be reduced 
and, thus, the optimal capacity of the incumbents follows the declining price. If all 
incumbents try to maintain their capacity at the now lower optimal level, a gap would 
be generated between supply and demand. New market entrants, with their improved 
technologies and lower production costs, would be attracted to the market to fill the 
gap between supply and demand, creating a higher level of competition that would 
                                                
177 Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation, supra note 28, at 564. 
178 TREMBLAY & TREMBLAY, supra note 163, at 14 (“In industrial organization, a 
central policy interest relates competition and efficiency. When inadequate competition leads 
to market power, price exceeds marginal cost and markets are statically inefficient.”). 
179 See infra Part App. (Equation 8). 
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drive the price even lower. This cycle, initiated by the reduction of price, is 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Feedback Cycle Caused by Reduction in Price 
 
 
As such, the decision to maintain an optimal capacity would eventually result 
in the exit of some incumbents. In order to stay in the market, the remaining 
incumbents must deviate from their optimal production by overproducing where, 
because of the artificial demand created by a mandate, the actual production,180 is 
higher than the optimal production.181 
It is important to note that the operational cost of monitoring and managing in 
our model is assumed to be a fixed cost. Thereby, an increase in production would 
lower the average fixed cost to thus develop economies of scale. Therefore, even 
though the deviation from the optimal production level would result in higher 
marginal costs than the constant marginal revenue, incumbents still benefit from 
preventing the entry of new competitors and developing economies of scale, as long 
as incumbents still make a nonnegative expected profit. 
Consequently, incumbents deviate from the optimal production rate to seek 
long-term survival in the ethanol market, and their average expected profit is a 
function of the price of ethanol minus the marginal costs of production and the 
average fixed costs (“AFC”).182 The AFC of a firm is the firm’s cost of monitoring 
and managing the operations of its opponents divided by the firm’s output capacity 
at a certain time.183 As explained above, based on the assumptions in our model, the 
marginal cost increases with the firm’s output capacity184 while the average fixed 
cost decreases with an increase in the firm output capacity.185 
                                                
180 See infra Part App. (Variable “𝑦#$”). 
181 See infra Part App. (Variable “𝑦#$∗”). 
182 See infra Part App. (Equation 9). 
183 See infra Part App. (Equation 10). 
184 See infra Part App. (Equation 11). 
185 See infra Part App. (Equation 12). 
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Finally, we apply the cost-benefit analysis and derive the firm capacity 
expansion decision.186 The pattern of production capacity would mirror the concave 
trend of entry discussed above because demand encourages entry, but the entry 
grows at a declining rate. The negative second derivative of the price of ethanol with 
respect to production187 implies decreasing returns to further capacity expansion. 
Production capacity also has a negative second derivative, and thus we can derive 
two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Production capacity increases with the increasing mandated 
demand. As proved above, an increase in the mandated demand will increase the 
production capacity.  
Hypothesis 2: Production capacity increases at a decreasing rate along the 
product life cycle. Nevertheless, this increase in production capacity will occur at an 
ever-decreasing rate over the PLC. The first mandated demand will increase the 
production capacity by a great deal. The second mandated demand will also increase 
the production capacity but to a lesser degree. Subsequent increases in mandated 
demand will become increasingly ineffective at generating production capacity 
increases. 
In our model, a firm can increase its production efficiency by increasing its 
capacity to compete with the new entrants that invest in the latest technology. 
Increasing demand encourages market competition by incentivizing capacity 
expansion and new entrants to the market, where only efficient firms will remain as 
competition increases. Because technology emerges and stabilizes after the PLC 
enters the mature phase, the mandated demand is effective in promoting economies 
of scale only in the nascent stage of PLC. A mandated demand encourages firms to 
expand production capacity and promotes entry of new firms with new technology. 
Price competition causes costs to be driven down, and then the market is no longer 
able to benefit from the new technologies that new entrants would bring to the 
market since decreased prices deter new firms from entering the market. Thus, once 
the market reaches a level where only efficient firms remain and competition ceases, 
an increase in mandated demand will be less effective in promoting economies of 
scale and the development of new technologies compared to how effective it was 
during the nascent stage of the industry. 
 
V.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
We will now utilize our model of large-scale mandatory demand described in 
the previous section to analyze industry data and examine the production capacity 
of first-generation ethanol plants in the U.S. Our objective is to determine the actual 
impact of the RFS policy in the ethanol industry through the lens of the PLC model. 
We find empirical evidence indicating that the RFS program stimulates the efficient 
development of the biofuels industry during the early growing phase in the PLC. 
  
                                                
186 See infra Part App. (Equation 13). 
187 See infra Part App. (Equation 14). 
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A.  Data/Methodology on the Ethanol Industry 
 
We gathered data on the characteristics of 216 ethanol production facilities that 
are listed in the Ethanol Produce Magazin188 and the Renewable Fuels Association’s 
(“RFA”) Annual Industry Outlook from 2000 through 2013.189 The facility level 
data are used for the plant-level analysis. Each plant in our data set is located in the 
United States. Of the 216 ethanol plants, 195 plants produce corn-based ethanol, and 
twenty-one plants use potato or beverage waste as inputs for ethanol production.190 
These plants are operated by 177 corporate firms. These firms produce ethanol that 
only qualifies as a basic renewable fuel for purposes of satisfying the RFS mandates.  
Plant and firm capacity are important research variables for our empirical 
analysis. We gathered information on these variables from the RFA’s Annual 
Industry Outlook and supplemented it with information published in Ethanol 
Producer Magazine. The time unit in our empirical analysis is one year, and each 
firm is treated as entering the ethanol market in the year it first registered with the 
relevant Secretary of State. Since we gathered data at the plant level, we used the 
information provided in OneSource.com 191  and Capital IQ 192  to identify the 
corporate tree for each ethanol plant. This information allows us to keep track of the 
firm growth with ownership changes of ethanol plants.  
To make our empirical analysis as precise as possible, we also collected 
information on the RFA Annual Industry Outlook from 2000 through 2013 and 
Ethanol Producer Magazine about plant location,193 total number of ethanol plants 
in a given state, plant age, the U.S. gasoline price, and the U.S. corn price. 
Information about the total number of ethanol plants and capacity are obtained from 
the RFA’s Annual Outlook, 194  while data on plant age was sourced from the 
information in the data set derived from Secretary of State Websites.195 The corn 
                                                
188  U.S. Ethanol Plants, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (Jan. 23, 2016), 
http://www.ethanolproducer.com/plants/listplants/US/Existing/Sugar-Starch/ [https://perma. 
cc/JQ8B-XZ84]. 
189 Annual Industry Outlooks, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/ 
resources/publications/outlook/ [https://perma.cc/R3DV-TMT4] (providing the Annual 
Industry Outlook from 2002–2015). 
190 See U.S. Ethanol Plants, supra note 188; see also Annual Industry Outlooks, supra 
note 189. 
191  See generally The Avention OneSource Advantage, AVENTION, 
https://www.avention.com/onesource-advantage [https://perma.cc/SL77-RY6J] (explaining 
the tools utilized to help with data collection on ethanol plants). 
192  See generally S&P Capital IQ Platform, S&P GLOBAL, 
http://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/ [https://perma.cc/D7GF-2Y9K] (showing company 
information regarding the platform utilized to help with data collection on ethanol plants). 
193 See Annual Industry Outlooks, supra note 189; U.S. Ethanol Plants, supra note 188.  
194 Annual Industry Outlooks, supra note 189. 
195 The empirical research covered all 50 Secretary of State websites, and the data used 
in the article is from 25 of them (AZ, CA, CO, GA, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MI, MN, 
MO, MS, ND, NE, NM, NY, OH, OR, PA, SD, WI, WY).  
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price came from the U.S. Department of Agriculture,196 and the gasoline price from 
the Nebraska Ethanol Board.197  
Agarwal suggests that the age of a product market and its quadratic form can 
be used to capture the industry life cycle phase effect.198 The ethanol industry in the 
United States dates back to 1979,199 so we define the U.S. ethanol industry’s age as 
the amount of time since 1979. 
Because the RFS mandated demand differs from year to year, we use a mandate 
variable, which represents the volume of the RFS mandates that can be satisfied with 
traditional renewable fuels (i.e., the category of fuel produced by all plants in our 
data set). The mandate variable equals zero when the RFS was not enacted. 
 
B.  Results and Discussion: The Impact of Demand on the Ethanol Industry’s 
Production Capacity 
 
In our empirical analysis, we answer the question of whether the RFS helps to 
improve economies of scale by investigating the impact of its mandated demand on 
production capacity. We determine the firm’s optimal capacity by taking the natural 
logarithm of both sides of the firm’s optimal capacity200 when it enters the market.201 
Nevertheless, the incumbent’s capacity deviates from the optimal level because of 
the growing mandated demand and the evolving PLC. Thus, we included the PLC 
effect in our empirical model and the plant/firm capacity in the empirical estimation.  
The right hand side of Equation 15 is treated as a constant term, and the cost is 
measured by the input price (i.e., price of corn). We decomposed the ethanol product 
price202 into three components: (1) a large-scale mandatory demand, (2) gasoline 
price, and (3) local competition (the number of ethanol plants within the same state). 
The natural log of corn and gasoline prices is taken and are lagged by one year to 
avoid endogeneity.  
Our empirical model is illustrated in the Appendix.203 The empirical result 
shows statistical evidence that a mandated demand positively correlates to capacity 
at both the production plant and firm level. However, the result does not hold when 
the sample is limited to the mature stage of PLC, as will be shown in Table 1. We 
                                                
196  See Feed Grains Database, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database.aspx [https://perma.cc/R8HB-
SYCG]. 
197 See Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline Average Rack Prices, OFFICIAL NEB. GOV’T 
WEBSITE, http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html [https://perma.cc/7XQR-VYLJ] (last 
updated Jan. 4, 2017). 
198 See Agarwal, supra note 170, at 514–20. 
199  See Ethanol History - From Alcohol to Car Fuel, ETHANOL HISTORY, 
http://www.ethanolhistory.com/ [https://perma.cc/8YWM-8877] (noting that in 1979, the 
Amoco Oil Company started marketing alcohol-blended fuels). 
200 See infra Part App. (Equation 5). 
201 See infra Part App. (Equation 15). 
202 See infra Part App. (Equation 2). 
203 See infra Part App. (Equation 16). 
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admit that our finding does not directly answer whether a large-scale mandatory 
demand regime in practice helps to improve the efficiency of biofuel production. 
This is due to limited data concerning plant-level production costs, which are not 
currently available and is unlikely to be available in the near future due to their 
potentially proprietary nature.  
 
1.  A Preliminary Analysis: The Product Life Cycle 
 
Two preliminary tests for the first and second propositions explained above 
confirm the appropriate economic model assumption in our study. The concave-
down trend of entry growth at both the firm and plant level after the enactment of 
the RFS2 in 2007, as shown in Figure 3, supports the first proposition that the 
mandated demand incentivizes new entry, but the growth of entry is at a declining 
rate. The declining pattern of the ratio of ethanol price to gasoline price in Figure 2 
is also consistent with the prediction of the second proposition. 
As previously mentioned, there are two channels through which an industry 
expands: (1) expansion of existing plants, and/or (2) construction of new plants. The 
growth patterns of the average plant-level and firm-level capacity are plotted in 
Figure 5, and the growth of the average firm-level capacity is steeper than the growth 
of plant-level capacity. Figure 5 shows that the firms are acquiring more plants to a 
greater degree than individual plants are growing in size because the firm-level 
capacity has increased, but the plant-level capacity has essentially remained the 
same. 
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Figure 5: Plant- and Firm-Level Capacity Patterns  
(in Millions of Gallons) 
 
Source: Renewable Fuels Association 
 
During the shakeout stage in the PLC, the period in which a large number of 
competing firms exit the market after the rapid growth and overexpansion of an 
industry, efficient firms further develop their economies of scale and inefficient 
firms leave, which sometimes involves resource reallocation in the form of M&A.204 
Figure 6 presents the acquisition activities (in millions of gallons of capacity) in the 
ethanol market. Increasing M&A activities are found during 2008–2010 and 2012–
2013.  
  
                                                
204 See Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation, supra note 28, at 579 (arguing that the 
firms that grow and continue during the shakeout stage are the better innovators). 
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Figure 6: Capacity Acquisition Pattern  
(in Millions of Gallons) 
 
Source: Renewable Fuels Association 
 
The first increasing pattern can be explained by the 2008 recession. The 
distressed economy forced inefficient firms to leave, and efficient firms took over 
the ownership to develop economies of scale and sustain the growth of the ethanol 
market. The increasing acquisition activity in 2013 might be a result of the economic 
recovery from the 2008 recession, or it may also be the result of the rise of oil prices. 
In February 2009, oil was $43.66 a barrel and by 2013, oil was around $100 a 
barrel.205  
In 2013, there were four acquisitions involving facilities which had been 
inactive since 2009 at a capacity of 133 million gallons, despite the fact that new 
plant operations contributed 115 million gallons, and existing plant expansion 
contributed 97.74 million gallons to the growth of the U.S. ethanol production 
capacity that year. Since in our model we consider that the ethanol price is tied to 
the price of gasoline, this can also be a reason for those facilities to be reactivated. 
The exemption from the 20% lifecycle GHG threshold requirement for the facilities 
constructed prior to December 19, 2007, (the date of enactment of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act) may explain why firms were incentivized to acquire 
inactive facilities rather than building new plants.206 
                                                
205  See Crude Oil Prices – 70 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, 
http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart [https://perma.cc/DWU8-
5K33]. 
206  See Renewable Fuel Standard, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/renewable-fuel-standard [https://perma.cc/R89Z-
CM32] (noting that the Grandfather Clause provides that “renewable fuel from existing 
facilities, which commenced construction on or before December 19, 2007, is exempt from 
the percent reduction from displaced gasoline/diesel for ‘renewable fuel’”). 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
196 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
 
 
2.  The Effects of the Renewable Fuel Standard on the Ethanol Plant Capacity 
 
Our model presents evidence that is consistent with the RFS mandated demand 
encouraging firms to expand production capacity and thus leading to economies of 
scale at the early growing phase in the PLC. We examine whether the RFS positively 
impacts the growth of plant-level and firm-level capacity via panel data analysis that 
controls for firm/plant random effects. In this Article, we adopt the Ordinary Least 
Squares (“OLS”) method.207 A regression is generally used when attempting to 
predict values of the dependent variable from independent variables.208 Hence, we 
have a dependent variable that we would like to understand and independent 
variables which will be used to make predictions for the dependent variable.209  
In our case, plant capacity and firm capacity are the primary dependent 
variables used to compare the effects of the RFS on ethanol plants and firms. The 
independent variables are corn price, gasoline price, number of ethanol plants within 
a state, and the mandated demand level (RFS mandate). The age of the ethanol 
market and its square are used to capture the effect of the different stages of the PLC. 
Firm age is used as a control variable to control for heterogeneous firm 
characteristics. The results of the OLS regression performed on these variables is 
presented in Table 1.  
  
                                                
207  See Ordinary Least Squares Linear Regression: Flaws, Problems and Pitfalls, 
CLOCKBACKWARD ESSAYS (June 18, 2009), http://www.clockbackward.com/2009/06/18/ 
ordinary-least-squares-linear-regression-flaws-problems-and-pitfalls/ [https://perma.cc/QD 
T4-KGL8]. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. In a linear regression such as the OLS, the assumption is that the dependent 
variable is fundamentally a linear function of the independent variables. Id. 
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Table 1: Random-effect OLS Regression Using the Plant Capacity as the 
Dependent Variable (DV) 
 DV: ln(Plant Capacity) DV: ln(Firm Capacity) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
RFS Mandate  0.0140** 0.0257  0.0201** 0.0626 
  (0.0047) (0.0417)  (0.0074) (0.0630) 
Lagged Corn 
Price 
0.0537 0.0314 -0.0277 0.1306* 0.0966+ 0.0129 
(0.0355) (0.0362) (0.0388) (0.0571) (0.0582) (0.0586) 
Lagged Gasoline 
Price 
-0.0524 -0.0364 0.0318 -0.0936+ -0.0733 0.087 
(0.0325) (0.0328) (0.0647) (0.0530) (0.0532) (0.0980) 
Number of Plants 
in State 
0.0962*** 0.0650* 0.1697*** 0.1071** 0.065 0.4093*** 
(0.0249) (0.0269) (0.0429) (0.0372) (0.0400) (0.0544) 
Age 0.1605*** 0.1083* 0.2112*** 0.1620* 0.0993 0.1730*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0448) (0.0081) (0.0662) (0.0698) (0.0109) 
Age2 -0.0023** -0.0017* -0.0033*** -0.0022* -0.0016 -0.0035*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
Firm Age -0.0135 -0.0053 -0.0569* 0.034 0.0487 0.0870* 
 (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0275) (0.0422) (0.0424) (0.0398) 
Constant 0.7576 1.7451*  0.5046 1.7311  
 (0.6005) (0.6836)  (0.9601) (1.0569)  
Observations 1392 1392 884 1010 1010 613 
Group 216 216 198 177 177 155 
R2 0.2071 0.1861 0.1642 0.1453 0.1146 0.1055 
Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are the standard error. +P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001.  
 
The results of analyzing the firm capacity are reported in the first three columns 
of Table 1. Model 1 consists of all variables except the mandatory demand of the 
RFS. Differently, Models 2 and 3 include the RFS mandate as an independent 
variable, where Model 3 analyzes only post-2008 data in order to investigate the 
effect of the RFS on plant capacity after the PLC enters the mature stage. In Model 
2, the value of 0.0140 with P < 0.01 suggests that the RFS mandate has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the plant capacity, and is associated with a 1.4% 
increase in plant capacity. 
When looking at the post-2008 data of Model 3, the RFS is no longer associated 
with a statistically significant effect on plant capacity. We find that the PLC 
variables of number of plants and market age have a statistically significant positive 
relation with plant capacity in Models 1–3, but the RFS mandate no longer posits 
significant impact on expanding plant capacity in Model 3. The corn price and the 
gasoline price do not have a significant effect on the plant capacity for any of the 
first three models. The two variables that are associated with an effect on the plant 
capacity in the mature stage of the ethanol market are the number of plants in a state 
and the age of the market, i.e., the PLC variables. These two variables are associated 
with a plant capacity increase of 16.97% and 21.12%, respectively, at the P < 0.001 
confidence level.  
The positive correlation between the number of plants in a state and plant 
capacity suggests that increasing the number of plants might raise the competition 
among firms. In turn, the increased competition among firms encourages the 
development of economies of scale by expanding capacity so that they can survive 
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in the competitive market. Our findings demonstrate that, while the RFS was 
associated with a positive effect on ethanol plant capacity during the ethanol 
market’s nascent stage, it appears that the RFS cannot be associated with an effect 
on plant capacity with any statistical significance after 2008 when the ethanol market 
entered its mature stage.  
In Models 4, 5, and 6, we investigate which independent variables are 
associated with a growth in firm capacity. As was the case for Model 1, Model 4 
does not include the RFS mandate as an independent variable. The RFS mandate is 
an independent variable in Models 5 and 6, and Model 6 analyzes only post-2008 
data from the mature stage of the ethanol industry. We still observe statistically 
significant effects of the RFS mandated demand on firm capacity until the ethanol 
market enters its mature phase in Model 6.  
Similar to the results found when examining plant capacity, if we ignore the 
effects of the RFS, the number of plants in a state and the age of the market are 
associated with statistically significant growth effects on firm capacity. This 
statistical significance no longer exists for those PLC variables when the RFS is 
included as an independent variable in Model 5. The data of Model 5 suggest that 
the RFS mandates can be associated with a 2.01% increase in firm capacity at the P 
< 0.01 confidence level. Moving on to the mature stage of the ethanol market in 
Model 6, the RFS mandate is no longer associated with any statistically significant 
effect on the firm capacity. Instead, the number of plants per state and the market 
age can be associated with 40.93% and 17.30% increases in the firm capacity, 
respectively, at the P < 0.001 confidence level.  
Once again, our data reinforces the fact that while the RFS was associated with 
a statistically significant increase in the firm capacity, it cannot be associated with 
any statistically significant effects on the firm capacity after the mature stage of the 
PLC was entered. Our empirical findings underscore the robustness of the 
implications derived from our theory.  
 
C.  Discussion: Policy Implications 
 
Our results and analysis, using the first-generation ethanol industry as our study 
subject, show that mandated demand has had an influence on developing economies 
of scale by incentivizing more new entry. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the 
policy is only effective at the early growing stage of the product life cycle. As such, 
if a de facto goal of the RFS is to create a viable and sustainable biofuels industry, 
our analysis and results show that it is helping to effectuate these goals only when 
the policy is enacted in the nascent stage of the PLC of the ethanol market.  
As noted above, Chen and Khanna found that U.S. corn ethanol production 
exhibits diseconomies of scale at the industry level.210 Our plant-level and firm-level 
empirical analyses do not show any contradiction. In fact, considering the new-entry 
effects and the learning-by-doing (“LBD”) effects suggested by Chen and 
                                                
210 See Chen & Khanna, supra note 124, at 157. 
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Khanna,211 it is not surprising to observe diseconomies of scale at the industry level 
with the presence of plant-level economies of scale. The importance of LBD 
indicates the inefficiency of new entrants. It is in line with our assumption that firms 
develop economies of scale by lowering average production cost through the 
expansion of production capacity. When an increasing number of incumbents is a 
normal characteristic of the nascent biofuel market, industry-level diseconomies of 
scale might result from the reduced average efficiency caused by new entrants. 
Hence, there is no contradiction to observe the coexistence of the plant-level 
economies of scale and the industry-level diseconomies of scale.  
Additionally, the U.S. Tax Code might also have some effect on ethanol plant 
capacity trends for the period analyzed in this Article. Although the provision 
expired on December 31, 2011, a small ethanol producer tax credit used to be in 
place that provided preferential tax treatment for ethanol plants with lower 
production capacities.212 Specifically, from 1990–2005, ethanol producers with a 
production capacity of less than thirty million gallons per year (“mgy”) (i.e., “small 
ethanol producers” for purposes of the U.S. Tax Code) were eligible to receive a 
$0.10 per gallon tax credit for their first fifteen million gallons of ethanol 
production.213 Accordingly, eligible small ethanol producers could receive a tax 
credit worth up to $1.5 million per year. In 2005, the Tax Code was amended to 
redefine a “small ethanol producer” as one whose production capacity is less than 
sixty mgy.214 Until its expiration at the close of 2011, the value of the tax credit 
remained the same with a maximum value of $1.5 million per year.215 As such, it 
would appear that: (1) from 1990–2005, firms generally had a tax incentive to build 
plants with capacities of less than thirty mgy; and (2) from 2006–2011, firms 
generally had a tax incentive to build plants with capacities of less than sixty mgy. 
However, our empirical analysis indicates that plants and firms tend to grow with 
the implementation of the RFS in spite of the tax credit incentives for small 
producers. Thus, the benefits from economies of scale seem more attractive than tax 
credits. 
That being said, there are a few limitations to the empirical analysis in this 
study. First, since our sample includes only ethanol plants that we observed entering 
the market in 2000 or later, our conclusions do not apply to plants that entered the 
market prior to 2000. Moreover, information about production cost and R&D 
investment could further assist us in directly testing the effect of economies of scale. 
However, gathering such information remains a challenge. 
                                                
211 See Chen & Khanna, supra note 124, at 153−54. 
212 See 26 U.S.C. § 40(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
213 Alicia Sue Rosburg, Essays Concerning the Cellulosic Biofuel Industry, at 9 (2012) 
(unpublished Graduate Theses and Dissertations, Paper 12725, Iowa State University), 
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3732&context=etd 
[https://perma.cc/XV5P-X7HS]. 
214 26 U.S.C. § 40(g)(1) (2012). 
215  See 26 U.S.C. § 40(b)(4)(C) (2012) (noting that fuel production is limited to 
15,000,000 gallons for any producer with the tax credit equal to $0.10 per gallon). 
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Despite the benefits of the RFS mandates at the early stage of the ethanol 
industry, a large-scale mandatory demand regime also has several theoretical 
disadvantages. By its very nature, the RFS program creates an excess demand for 
biofuels above what the market forces of supply and demand would otherwise 
determine. 216  Moreover, simple economic theory predicts that excess demand 
encourages new entrants to act opportunistically, which could cause incumbents to 
expand production capacity to deter entry.217 In addition, the RFS will generate 
additional demand for biofuel feedstock, which will likely cause the price of inputs 
for biofuel production to rise, although this Article does not intend to comment on 
the food versus fuel debate. 218  Our empirical finding corroborates our model 
implication and suggests that the RFS program incentivizes the efficient 
development of an economically sustainable biofuels industry during its nascent 
PLC phase. 
Finally, the fact that the RFS mandates for advanced and cellulosic biofuels 
increase disproportionately to its mandate for basic renewable fuel (i.e., first-
generation ethanol) indicates an ultimate policy goal of incentivizing their use over 
first-generation biofuels.219 Unfortunately, it remains unanswered whether or not the 
RFS will produce the same results for the second-generation biofuels industry that 
we have seen for the first-generation ethanol industry. The difficulty in extrapolating 
our results to the second-generation biofuels industry stems from the fact that it is at 
a different stage of its product life cycle. When the RFS was first implemented, first-
generation ethanol was already being produced at large-scale commercial facilities 
through proven conversion technologies.220  
                                                
216 See Richard Webb, The Economic Effects of an Ethanol Mandate, Australian Parl. 
Paper No. 18 2007–08 (January 22, 2008).  
217 See Mike Fusillo, Excess Capacity and Entry Deterrence: The Case of Ocean Liner 
Shipping Markets, 5 MAR. ECON. & LOGISTICS 100, 100–02 (2003). 
218 See John M. Urbanchuk, The Renewable Fuel Standard and Consumer Food Prices, 
ABF ECON. (Jun. 7, 2013), http://ethanolrfa.3cdn.net/281d77a62939896ba8_8nm6bevpj.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36UH-5TAR] (discussing the impact of the RFS and biofuel mandates on 
food prices); see also Brent J. Hartman, The Renewable Fuel Standard: Food Versus Fuel?, 
65 ME. L. REV. 525, 547 (2011) (arguing that the RFS policy does not require only feedstocks 
that are traditionally used for food and feed, but rather, there are many opportunities for non-
food feedstocks that can be advanced). 
219  See Phil Ciciora, Study: Renewable Fuel Standard Needs to be Modified, Not 
Repealed, ILL. NEWS BUREAU (Oct. 14, 2003 9:00 AM), https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view 
/6367/204722 [https://perma.cc/VWY3-7HXQ] (noting that the crucial goal of the RFS is 
“to incentivize the increased commercialization of second-generation biofuels, such as 
cellulosic biofuels that do not rely on food-related feedstocks for their production”). 
220 See Ned Stowe, Issue Brief: Requests to Waive the Renewable Fuel Standard in the 
Aftermath of the 2012 Heat Wave, ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST. (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.eesi.org/papers/view/issue-brief-requests-to-waive-the-renewable-fuel-standard 
[https://perma.cc/45GV-7765] (noting that first-generation corn ethanol was produced at 
commercial scale before 2005). 
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In contrast, the first wave of commercial-scale second-generation biofuel 
production facilities is only now being built and their conversion technologies have 
yet to be proven on a commercial scale.221 As such, we would not expect the RFS to 
have similar effects on the second-generation biofuels industry until it has reached 
the same product life cycle point as the first-generation ethanol industry when the 
RFS was put in place. The policy implication of this is that it might be prudent to 
keep alternative policy instruments (e.g., tax incentives, loan guarantees, R&D grant 
funding, etc.) in place to continue incentivizing the development of the second-
generation biofuels industry. Once it reaches a later stage in its product life cycle, 
we could then begin to see the RFS have similar effects on the second-generation 
biofuels industry as we have seen it have on the first-generation ethanol industry. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article sought to improve the understanding of the economic implications 
of the RFS program to the different stages of the biofuels industry. In this Article, 
we analyzed how the RFS mandates impact the ethanol market at the different stages 
introduced by the PLC model. We show that the mandatory demand regime 
implemented via the RFS program has been an effective policy instrument to 
promote the nascent first-generation ethanol industry.  
Our model suggests that ethanol mandates positively correlate to capacity at 
both the plant and firm level at the early growing stage of the product life cycle of 
the ethanol market. In other words, after the industry overcomes its early growing 
stage, mandated demand does not favor production-related economies of scale. 
According to our findings, the ethanol industry witnessed a steady growth in the 
number of firms and plants during the first years the RFS was implemented. The 
mandated demand, at this stage, helps to develop competition by promoting new 
entry and capacity expansion. Consequently, our findings suggest that the first-
generation ethanol industry tended to grow with the implementation of the RFS 
policy because mandated demand had an influence on developing economies of 
scale by incentivizing more new entry. 
On the other hand, our empirical analysis has also found that, after 2008, the 
industry growth slowed. That is because, despite the fact that we expect an expansion 
in the number of firms as the mandated demand grows, the new entrants in the 
mature stages of the PLC do not posit significant competitive advantage in terms of 
production efficiency. Hence, we conclude that mandates are effective in promoting 
economies of scale in the biofuel market only in the nascent stage of its PLC. 
                                                
221 JOERN HUENTELER ET AL., Commercializing Second-Generation Biofuels: Scaling 
Up Sustainable Supply Chains and the Role of Public Policy, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L 
AFFAIRS, Harvard Kennedy School (Nov. 13–14, 2014), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
files/commercializing-2ndgen-biofuels-web-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N56K-MNS8] 
(noting the benefits of second-generation biofuels and discussing the challenges to 
commercialization of second-generation biofuels in the U.S.).  
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Consequently, the RFS mandated demand regime is not as effective after the 
market becomes mature. Given the “blend wall” and the ineffectiveness of the RFS 
policy after 2008, we suggest that policy makers reconsider the policy instrument in 
further promoting the ethanol industry. By implication, as noted earlier in this 
Article, it is possible that the RFS could have these similar effects on the nascent 
second-generation biofuels industry once it too reaches significant production at 
commercial scale. Moreover, policy makers might need to consider alternative 
policy instruments in responding to different stages of the product life cycle in the 
biofuels industry. 
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APPENDIX:  A PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF THE RENEWABLE 
FUEL STANDARD ETHANOL MANDATE 
 
The following table shows the list of variables used in our model:  
Variables  
Variable Notes i Firm, subscript 
t Time, subscript 𝑃$ Price of ethanol at a certain time or 
marginal revenue 𝑦#$ Firm’s output capacity (at a certain 
time) 𝑘#$ Quantity of input 𝐴# Firm’s production efficiency level 
assumed to be exogenously given 𝑃*+,-.#/0,$ Price of gasoline (at a certain time) 𝐹 Firm’s cost of monitoring and 
managing the operations of its 
opponents 𝑐 Input cost (constant) 𝑛$ Number of firms 𝑄$ Market demand (at a certain time) 𝑛$ Number of firms 𝑦#$/5#67  Accumulated supply of all firms 𝛽$ Mandated growth rate 𝜋#$ Firm’s profit (at a certain time) 
 
The following mathematical explanation describes our theoretical model.  
Klepper presents a complete model showing regularities along PLC. He shows 
that over time, increasing production efficiency cannot catch up with the declining 
price pattern driven by exogenous factors that are not controlled by individual firms. 
As such, product markets eventually will stop growing with increasing production 
efficiency.  
We modify the PLC model assumptions to fit the characteristics of the ethanol 
market. The expected profit function of firm 𝑖 is 𝐸 𝜋#$ = 𝐸[𝑃$𝑦#$ − 𝑐$𝑘#$ − 𝐹], s.t. 𝑦#$ = 𝐴#𝑘#$@, where 0 < 𝛼 < 1.	𝑃$ and 𝑦#$ are the price and firm 𝑖’s output capacity 
at time 𝑡. 𝑘#$  is the quantity of input (Equation 1). 𝐴#  shows firm 𝑖’s production 
efficiency level and it is assumed to be exogenously given. Greater 𝐴#  indicates 
higher efficiency, and 𝐴# is determined at the latest technology level available for 
investment when firm 𝑖 decides to enter the ethanol market. The technology keeps 
evolving, and new entrants are able to produce more efficiently with a higher 𝐴# in 
their production function. However, the pattern of innovation usually slows down 
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after the PLC enters the mature stage, and thus new entrants’ relative advantage in 
production efficiency also decreases based on their entry timing.  
In addition to the production cost, 𝐹  is the firm’s cost of monitoring and 
managing the operations of its opponents. In order to simplify this model, a constant 
input cost, 𝑐, is assumed in the expected profit function. 
The ethanol product price, 𝑃$ = 	𝑃$(𝑄$, 𝑃*+,-.#/0,$, 𝑛$), is a function of demand, 
the price of gasoline, and the number of manufacturers (Equation 2). The market 
demand at period 𝑡, 𝑄$, is cleared by the accumulated supply of all firms, 𝑦#$/5#67 , 
where 𝑛$ is the number of firms (Equation 3). Because the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price are highly correlated, we assume that 𝑃$ is a function of 𝑃*+,-.#/0,$. 
In addition to the effect from the changes of gasoline price, industry evolution theory 
suggests that price declines with growing demand over time due to competition 
among firms, which also results in increasing production efficiency at the industry 
level. In the long run, inefficient firms would be driven out of the market if their 
expected profit is less than zero. Price would then stay stable, ceteris paribus.  
We solve a firm’s profit maximization problem with respect to 𝑦#$, and the first 
order condition for 𝑦#$. The marginal cost,	𝑐$	𝛼I7𝐴$I7 @	𝑦#$(7I@) @, increases with 𝑦#$ , while the marginal revenue, 𝑃$ , is a constant (Equation 5). As such, we can 
derive the optimal capacity,  𝑦#$∗ = @	J5K L	M5N5 LKOL	(Equation 5). 
Substituting 𝑦#$∗ into the expected profit function and then firms would make an 
entry decision if the expected optimal profit, 𝐸 𝜋#$|𝑦#$∗ , is greater than zero 
(Equation 6). The exit decision, on the other hand, is based on the zero profit 
condition, and firms exit if they make a negative profit. An inefficient firm with 
smaller 𝐴#  cannot compete with efficient firms. Therefore, only firms that can 
economically survive the competition would remain in the product market.  
In the ethanol market, market demand is mandated in each period, which causes 
a change in demand. We define 𝑄$/𝑄$I7 = 1 + 𝛽$ , where 𝛽$  is the mandated 
growth rate of the total quantity demanded and is always positive (Equation 7). The 
growing market demand creates profitable opportunities for new entrants to act 
opportunistically when the incumbents hesitate to increase production capacity by 
deviating from their optimal production capacity. Thus, we expect an increasing 
number of firms with the growth of the mandated demand. However, when the PLC 
turns to the mature stage, new entrants no longer have a great competitive advantage 
in terms of production efficiency, 𝐴# , because the technology emerges. As such, 
reduced opportunities would make the mandated demand attract fewer new entrants 
as the market emerges. Two results would reflect the nature of the model.  
Lemma 1: The mandated demand incentivizes new entry, but the growth of entry is 
at a declining rate.  
The growing market demand creates profitable opportunities for new entrants. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, when the PLC enters a mature stage, these new 
entrants no longer have a competitive advantage in terms of production efficiency. 
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That is because the technology that once was their advantage has now been 
developed and is common to all market participants.  
Lemma 2: New entry results in more competition, thus bringing the price down.  
The demand shift would cause the change of price. Because new entrants hold 
the latest technology, they are able to produce with a lower marginal cost and then 
gain their market share through price competition. Thus the ethanol price would be 
cut as a result of rivalry, and the price reflects a decreasing pattern along the PLC.  
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, the optimal capacity of the incumbents needs to be 
reduced in response to the declining price pattern ( ∵ 𝑑𝐸 𝜋#$|𝑦#$∗ /𝑑𝑃$ > 0 ) 
(Equation 8). If all incumbents try to maintain their capacity at the optimal level, the 
released market share would attract more new entrants and, later, a higher level of 
competition would drive the price even lower. As such, the decision to maintain an 
optimal capacity would eventually result in the incumbents’ exit.  
Thus, in order to stay in the market, incumbents must deviate from their optimal 
production capacity, where the capacity	𝑦#$ > 	 𝑦#$∗. Because the operational cost of 
monitoring and managing in our model is assumed to be a fixed cost, an increase in 
production would lower the average fixed cost to thus develop economies of scale. 
Hence, even though the deviation from the optimal production level would cause 
higher marginal costs than the constant marginal revenue, incumbents still benefit 
from deferring entry and developing economies of scale, so long as incumbents still 
make a nonnegative expected profit. 
Incumbents deviate from the optimal production rate to seek long term survival 
in the ethanol market, and their average expected profit: 𝐴𝑃#$ = W XY5ZY5 = 𝐸[𝑃$ −𝛼𝑀𝐶#$ − 𝐴𝐹𝐶#$]  (Equation 9), where 𝐴𝐹𝐶#$ = ]ZY5	 (Equation 10). Based on the 
assumptions in our model, the marginal cost increases with 𝑦#$, ^_`Y5^ZY5 > 0	(Equation 
11), and the average fixed cost decreases with 𝑦#$, ^J]`Y5^ZY5 = 	 ^( abY5)^ZY5 < 0 (Equation 12). 
We apply the cost-benefit analysis, and derive the firm capacity expansion decision 
when ^JMY5^ZY5 = 	− N@ 	𝐴#IKL	𝑦#$KOLL 	+ 	𝐹𝑦#$Ic  > 0 (Equation 13). The pattern of 
production capacity would mirror the concave down trend of entry growth because 
of Lemma 1 and the second derivative, ^dJMY5^ZY5d < 0 (Equation 14), which implies 
decreasing returns to capacity expansion. Thus we can derive the following two 
propositions. 
Hypothesis 1: Production capacity increases with the increasing mandated 
demand. 
Hypothesis 2: Production capacity increases at a decreasing speed along the 
product life cycle. 
In our model, a firm can increase its production efficiency by increasing its 
capacity to compete with the new entrants that invest in the latest technology. 
Increasing demand encourages market competition by incentivizing capacity 
expansion and new entry, and only efficient firms survive after competition. Because 
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technology emerges after the PLC turns to a mature phrase, the mandate demand is 
effective in promoting economies of scale only in the nascent stage of PLC.  
Finally, in our empirical analysis, we answer the question of whether the RFS 
helps to improve economies of scale by investigating the impact of its mandated 
demand on production capacity. Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of 
Equation 5 yields: ln 𝑦#$∗ = 𝛼1 − 𝛼 [ ln 𝐴$7 @ + ln 𝛼 − ln 𝑐$ + ln 𝑃$ 𝑄$, 𝑃*+,-.#/0,$, 𝑛$ ] 
(Equation 15). 
Equation 15 shows a firm’s optimal capacity decision when it enters the market. 
However, the incumbent’s capacity deviates from the optimal level for the growing 
mandated demand and the evolving PLC. Thus, we included the PLC effect in our 
empirical model. We consider the plant/firm capacity in the empirical estimation. At 
the right hand side of Equation 15, (ln 𝐴$7 @ + ln 𝛼) is treated as a constant term, 
and the cost is measured by the input price (i.e., corn price). We decompose the price, 𝑃$ 𝑄$, 𝑃*+,-.#/0,$, 𝑛$ , into three components: (1) a large-scale mandatory demand, 
(2) gasoline price, and (3) local competition (number of ethanol plants within the 
same state). The corn and gasoline prices are taken natural log and are lagged by one 
year to avoid endogeneity.  
Therefore, our empirical model is as follows: ln 𝑦#$= 𝛽g + 𝛽7	𝑅𝐹𝑆 + 𝛽c ln 𝑐$+ 𝛽j ln 𝑃*+,-.#/0,$ + 	𝛽k ln 𝑛$ + 	𝛽l	𝐴𝑔𝑒 +	𝛽o	𝐴𝑔𝑒c (Equation 16). 
  
The empirical result shows statistical evidence that a mandated demand positively 
correlates to capacity at both plant and firm level. However, the result does not hold 
when the sample is limited to the mature stage of PLC. We admit that our finding 
does not directly answer whether a large-scale mandatory demand regime helps to 
improve the efficiency of biofuel production in practice. This is due to limited data 
concerning plant-level production costs, which is not currently available and is 
unlikely to be available in the near future. 
